----- Original Message ----- From: Chris Benham Date: Saturday, July 12, 2008 11:01 pm Subject: Re:A Better Version of IRV? To: EM Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Forest, > "The voter ranks all she wants to and the remaining candidates > are ranked (later, i.e. below) by the voter's > favorite or perhaps, as Steve Eppley has suggested, by the > voter's specified public ranking. > > Since IRV satisfies LNH, what's the harm in this?". > The harm is that voter's votes are used to help candidates that > the voters may not wish to help. > It offends the principle that the voter should be fully in > control of his/her vote. > Giving some voters (candidates) the power to fully control their > own vote and also to complete > the rankings of some of the truncators offends the principle > that as far as possible all voters > should have equal power. This is easy to fix: just make it optional. > "In Australia, where (in single winner elections) most of the > voters copy candidate cards, this would save > them a lot of bother." > In Australia the only significant "bother" stems from compulsory > full strict ranking (for the vote to be > counted as valid). Suppose that compulsory ranking were removed. In the multi-winner case, "above the line" voting would still be a great practical help. Help me find the best single winner analog of "above the line" voting. > > > >This particular horrible idea would create a strong incentive > >for the major power-brokers to sponsor the nomination of a > > lot of fake candidates just to collect votes for one or other > >of the major parties. > > "Am I mising something here?" > Yes, but I'm not sure exactly what. Why do you think parties would run fake candidates? > > "I thought IRV was clone free." > It is, but that isn't relevant. Fake candidates from the same party would tend to be clones. > > > >How do you think it "might be a valuable improvement"?? What > >scenario do you have in mind? > > "(Besides the aboved mentioned advantage): > > In conjunction with the candidate withdrawal option, it might > enable the (other) losing candidates to save the > Condorcet candidate, or otherwise compensate for IRV's non- > monotonicity." > I've previously made my case against the "candidate withdrawal > option". > http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods- > electorama.com/2008-March/021463.html > > http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods- > electorama.com/2008-March/021471.html I'll read these. > > I don't see how IRV's failure to elect the Condorcet candidate > is necessarily linked to its "non-monotonicity". > There are monotonic (meets mono-raise) methods that fail > Condorcet, and some Condorcet methods that > fail mono-raise. I didn't intend to give the impression that these two problems were related. Only that they might both be improved by similar tweaks. > > I'm not impressed with embracing some evil definites in exchange > for some vague "mights". This thread is an appeal to brainstorm, not a finished proposal. > >And what do you have in mind as "Australia's worst problems > >with their version of IRV"? > > "It has degenerated into a defacto second rate version of Asset > Voting." > To the extent that that is true it can (and should) be fixed by > simply allowing truncation. Warren's page on the subject http://www.rangevoting.org/AusAboveTheLine07.html gives the impression that allowing truncation would not fix the problem. It is most clear in the multi- winner case, but the same psychology applies in the single winner case. > > >Why do you want to "stop" IRV? Do you agree with Kathy Dopp > >that IRV is worse than FPP? > > "I would stop IRV if we could get a better method in its place. > > If we cannot stop IRV, why not search for acceptable tweaks that > would improve it?" > The short answer is because IRV isn't really amenable to > "tweaks". How about if the only tweaks are to facilitate the gathering of voter preferences in a way that makes it easier for the voters to vote? > In terms of positive > criterion compliances it isn't dominated by any other method, > and has both good and quite > bad properties (averaging in my judgement to a "good" method). > "Tweaks" generally muck > up its good properties without enough compensation in terms of > fixing or patching up its > bad properties. > I think Smith (or Shwartz),IRV is quite a good Condorcet > method. It completely fixes the > failure of Condorcet while being more complicated (to explain > and at least sometimes to > count) than plain IRV, and a Mutual Dominant Third candidate > can't be successfully buried. > But it fails Later-no-Harm and Later-no-Help, is vulnerable to > Burying strategy, fails > mono-add-top, and keeps IRV's failure of mono-raise and > (related) vulnerability to > Pushover strategy. > > > "It is better than FPP in some ways and worse in others, > especially in complexity." > With separate paper ballots for each race, I don't accept that > IRV is all that "complex". > I think that you have somewhat dodged my question. It doesn't seem too complex to you, but how about to the voters in public elections? Most of the ordinary voters that I have talked to agree with Lewis Carroll. They would rather not have to fill out rankings. Forest ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
