1. Dopp wanted simple nonmonotone IRV elections examples. See http://rangevoting.org/Monotone.html
and here is another: #voters Their Vote 8 B>A>C 5 C>B>A 4 A>C>B If two of the B>A>C voters change their vote to A>B>C, that causes their true-favorite B to win under IRV. (If they vote honestly ranking B top as is, then their most-hated candidate, C, wins.) 2. Roullin advocated "median voting". That is discussed here: http://rangevoting.org/MedianVrange.html median has a lot of disadvantages versus averaging, but few advantages - which in my view are not enough. 3. Bolson's page on IRV http://bolson.org/voting/irv/ I agree with it, he has independently reached the same views as mine -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking "endorse" as 1st step) and math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
