Here's another way to explain the same numbers.
Initial opinions:
6 B>A>C (or B>C>A)
2 A>B>C (or A>C>B)
5 C>B>A
4 A>C>B
B would win. But before the election the two A>B>C voters will change
their (sincere) opinion to (sincere) B>A>C. As a result C will win. B
thus got more first place support but lost the election.
Juho
On Aug 7, 2008, at 4:11 , Warren Smith wrote:
1. Dopp wanted simple nonmonotone IRV elections examples.
See
http://rangevoting.org/Monotone.html
and here is another:
#voters Their Vote
8 B>A>C
5 C>B>A
4 A>C>B
If two of the B>A>C voters change their vote to A>B>C, that causes
their true-favorite B to win under IRV.
(If they vote honestly ranking B top as is, then their most-hated
candidate, C, wins.)
2. Roullin advocated "median voting". That is discussed here:
http://rangevoting.org/MedianVrange.html
median has a lot of disadvantages versus averaging, but few
advantages - which in my view are
not enough.
3. Bolson's page on IRV
http://bolson.org/voting/irv/
I agree with it, he has independently reached the same views
as mine
--
Warren D. Smith
http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking "endorse"
as 1st step)
and
math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html
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