Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Morning, Raph

When I offered to send you a draft of the petition outlining a method of selecting candidates for public office, I planned to send it privately. After seeing your response, I asked the author's permission to post it publicly and he agreed. Here's the draft in its current form:


(draft)            (draft)            (draft)            (draft)

                       P-E-T-I-T-I-0-N

          To the Sefton Metropolitan Borough Council
[SNIP]

ILLUSTRATION
This table describes the method by which the members of the Church Ward will select candidates for the Sefton Metropolitan Borough Council:

                                     Select
                                    Randomly
                                      From
                       Full   Over  Previous   Total
    Level Candidates  Triads  flow    Level   Triads  Selected(1)
      1)     9001      3000     1       0      3000     3000
      2)     3001(2)   1000     1       2      1001     1001
      3)     1001       333     2       1       334      334
      4)      334       111     1       2       112      112
      5)      112        37     1       2        38       38
      6)       38        12     2       1        13       13
      7)       13         4     1       2         5        5
      8)        5         1     2       1         2        2(3)

This sounds a lot like what I've previously referred to as "council democracy". In a council democracy, you have councils of size p. Each elect one of its number to the next council. The coverage is exponential in the number of levels.

I wonder if the problems of council democracy also would affect this proposal. The first problem of council democracy is that it magnifies opinion in a possibly chaotic manner. Say, for the sake of the argument, that there's an opinion held by r% of the people. What value of r is required so that there's a way that the majority of the final council will hold that opinion?

That's ((floor(p/2) + 1)/p) ^ q, where there are q levels. Intuitively, that's a "majority of a majority of a majority ... of a majority". Let's see what this is for 8 levels and a majority of 2/3 (as with your triads). In the very worst case, an opinion held by (2/3)^8 = 4% can be held by a majority of the last triad.

Your randomization thwarts strategists from deliberately poisoning the triad system, something that could be done in a council democracy, but the point holds: because the comparisons are local, disproportionality can accumulate.

Your overflow solution is interesting, as it deals with the second problem of council democracy in that there's no "obvious" (for non-random councils at least) way of making the numbers even at each level.


One could reduce the first problem by having a larger group that elects more than one member. Perhaps a group of five that elects two in a PR manner? In order for the opinion to be transmitted from a level to the one above, both must hold it, so two Droop quotas have to have it. That is, if I'm doing this right, 4/5. The reduction:

Level   Candidates     5-groups  Overflow   Elect from prev.
0       9001           1800      1          0
1       3601(2)        720       1          4
2       1442           288       2          3
3       578            115       3          2
4       232            46        2          3
5       94             18        4          1
6       38             7         3          2
7       14             2         4          1
8       3              1         4          1
9       2              1         (Elect one to fill 5-group)

The minimum possible opinion that can attain a majority here has (4/5)^9 = 13.4% support among the people. That's better, even if it's still low.
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