Dear Jonathan Lundell, I wrote (7 Oct 2008):
> Well, the second paper is more general. Here they use > Arrow's Theorem to argue why monotonicity has to be > sacrificed. You wrote (7 Oct 2008): > Or at least that something has to be sacrificed. Do > you see that as a problem? Well, monotonicity is actually not needed in Arrow's Theorem. Therefore, Arrow's Theorem is frequently stated as saying that no single-winner election method can satisfy (1) universal admissibility, (2) Pareto, (3) nondictatorship, and (4) independence from irrelevant alternatives. Therefore, using Arrow's Theorem to argue that monotonicity should be sacrificed to get compatibility with the other criteria seems to be odd. Markus Schulze ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
