On Fri, 17 Oct 2008 22:08:32 +0200 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
I suggest a two-step resolution:
Agree to a truce between Condorcet and Range, while they dispose
of IRV as being less capable than Condorcet.
Then go back to the war between Condorcet and Range.
I think the problem, or at least a part of it, is that if we (the
election-methods members) were to advocate a method, to be effective, it
would have to be the same method. Otherwise, we would "split the vote",
as it were, against the status quo. Therefore, both Condorcet and Range
groups would prefer their own method to "win".
If that's true, then one way of uniting without running into that would
be to show how IRV is bad, rather than how Condorcet or Range is better.
If there's to be unity (or a truce) in that respect, those examples
would focus on the properties where both Range and Condorcet, or for
that matter, most methods, are better than IRV, such as in being
monotonic, reversal symmetric, etc.
First, IRV will slay us all if we do not attend to it - it is getting USED.
Range and Condorcet are among the leaders and ask two different conflicting
thought processes and expressions of the voters:
Condorcet ranks per better vs worse, but asks not for detailed
thought: A>B>C ranks A as best of these three.
Range easily rates A-100 and C-0. Same thought as for Condorcet
would rate B between them, but deciding exactly where can be a headache.
Each of these has its backers, but we cannot devote full time to this
battle while we need to defend our turf against IRV.
I suggest concentrating on Condorcet disposing of IRV because both use
almost identical rank ballots and usually agree as to winner. They look at
different aspects:
Condorcet looks only at comparative ranking. When they matter, we
ask only whether A>B or B>A is voted by more voters.
IRV cares only what candidate ranks first on a ballot, though it
looks at next remaining candidate after discarding first ranked as a loser.
Sample partial election:
9 A>E
9 B>A
18 C>A
20 D>A
A is WELL LIKED HERE and would win in Condorcet. Count one last
voter for IRV:
A - B and C lose, and D loses to A.
B - A, E, and B lose, and C loses to D.
C or D - D wins.
What Condorcet calls cycles inspire much debate. Optimum handling does
deserve thought, but could be directed more as to how to resolve them.
Real topic is that comparing rankings can show three or more of the best
candidates are close enough to ties to require extra analysis.
I claim this is a comparatively good thing - the worst candidates end
up outside the cycles and it is, at least, no worse than random choice to
award the win to what is seen as the best of them.
Having election results in understandable format is valuable for many purposes:
Condorcet records all that it cares about for any district, such as
precinct, in an N*N array. These arrays can be summed for larger districts
such as county or state. Also they can be published, in hopefully
understandable form, for all interested.
Range has less information to make available.
IRV talks of recounting ballots as it steps thru discarding losers -
at any rate not as convenient as Condorcet.
An expected response is that these properties don't matter because they
happen so rarely. To reply to that, I can think of two strategies. The
first would be to count failures in simulations close to how voters
would be expected to act, perhaps with a reasoning of "we don't know
what strategy would be like, but the results would be worse than for
honesty, so these provide a lower bound". The second would be to point
to real uses, like Australia's two-party domination with IRV, or Abd's
argument that TTR states who switched to IRV have results much more
consistent with Plurality than what used to be the case.
Condorcet has no interest in being like Plurality. Its big plus over
Plurality is letting voters rank those candidates they want to rank as
best, etc., and using this data.
Simulations are tricky - when can we honestly claim expected matches reality?
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED] people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
