On Mon, Oct 20, 2008 at 7:15 AM, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Consider these sincere preference orders: > > 40 A>B>C > 20 B>A>C > 40 C>B>A > > I can't see any reason why it couldn't be expected that only A will > receive majority approval, but B would defeat A in a runoff.
Assume they use the 'approve the best of the top 2 + anyone you prefer to the expected winner'. Option 1) B + A(2nd) expected top 2 40: A 20: B 40: B + C A: 40 B: 60 C: 40 Option 2) B+C(2nd) expected top 2 40: A+B 20: B 40: C A: 40 B: 60 C: 40 In both cases, B is the only one with a majority. The strategy would likely switch between the 2, and it is unlikely to be perfectly balanced 40-40 between A and C. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
