2008/10/20 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > You could also have the approval version of Smith,IRV. Call it > Condorcet,Approval. I think it's Smith (so it would be Smith,Approval), but > I'm not sure. The method is this: Drop candidates, starting with the > Approval loser and moving upwards, until there's a CW. Then that one is the > winner. >
This method is Definite Majority Choice. It meets Smith. > > Is Condorcet,Approval (Smith,Approval?) nonmonotonic? Probably not, if you change the position of the approval cutoff. Please someone confirm. > If not, and it is Smith, then you have a simple Smith-compliant > Condorcet/approval method. > In DMC there's a possibility to the buriers' faction approve a turkey, intending to drop the buried candidate as the least approved. > > > These methods would obviously need approval cutoff ballots (unless you go > with the MDDA assumption, that the approval cutoff is where the voter > truncates, but I don't think that would be a good idea here). > -- ________________________________ Diego Renato dos Santos
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