Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (Sat.Oct.18): >Because Smith is more complex to explain, my current favorite election >method is Condorcet//Approval. We don't need complex algorithms to find >a >winner.
You could also have the approval version of Smith,IRV. Call it Condorcet,Approval. I think it's Smith (so it would be Smith,Approval), but I'm not sure. The method is this: Drop candidates, starting with the Approval loser and moving upwards, until there's a CW. Then that one is the winner. Kristofer, The method you describe isn't Smith,Approval (which is the same thing as Smith//Approval). Smith,Approval elects the member of the Smith set highest-ordered by Approval on the original ballots, Smith//Approval first eliminates (drops from the ballots) all non-members of the Smith set and applies Approval to the remaining candidates. Since approval is treated as 'absolute' it doesn't make a difference like it does between Smith,IRV and Smith//IRV. The method you describe has IRV-like mono-raise failure and Pushover strategy vulnerability. 31: A>B 32: B>C 31: C>A 06: C All ranked candidates are approved, and all candidates are in the Smith set. A>B 62-32, B>C 63-31, C>A 69-31. Approval scores: A62, B63, C69. A is eliminated and B wins, but if 2 of the 6 C votes change to A then C wins. 31: A>B 32: B>C 31: C>A 04: C 02: A The Approval winner C is the clearly strongest candidate (the most first preferences and the most second preferences) in both cases. "These methods would obviously need approval cutoff ballots (unless you go with the MDDA assumption, that the approval cutoff is where the voter truncates, but I don't think that would be a good idea here)." Here I agree with Kevin Venzke. Allowing voters to rank among candidates they don't approve just makes the method more vulnerable to Burial strategy and makes the proposal much more complex. Chris Benham Send instant messages to your online friends http://au.messenger.yahoo.com
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