Topic below is monotonicity, which seems discardable as a side issue.
Of more importance is IRV's NOT CARING whether more voters indicate
preferring A>B or B>A - can even declare A the winner when a majority of
voters prefer B of this pair.
Example:
20 A>B
15 C>B>A
10 D>B>A
Here a majority prefer B>A, but C and D have a special attraction for some
some minorities.
DWK
On Thu, 6 Nov 2008 11:23:39 -0700 Kathy Dopp wrote:
FYI,
Defendants in the MN Case (who are promoting IRV and STV methods) have
just released new affidavits to the court that discuss Arrow's theorem
as supporting the case for IRV/STV and dismissing the importance of
IRV's nonmonotonicity.
I posted three of these most recent affidavits of the defendants of
Instant Runoff Voting and STV here:
http://electionmathematics.org/em-IRV/DefendantsDocs/
The first two docs listed are by Fair Vote's new expert witness.
The third doc is by the Minneapolis, MN City attorney.
The defendants characterize Arrow's theorem as proving that "there
exists no unequivocally satisfactory, or normatively appealing, voting
rule." and claim the "possibility of nonmonotonic results plagues ALL
potential democratic voting systems with 3 or more candidates unless a
dictatorial voting rule is adopted."
I would appreciate it if any of you have time to read some of the
above three docs, particularly the third document by the attorney, and
give me your responses.
FYI, the plaintiff's characterizes Arrow's theorem on p. 3 of this doc:
http://electionmathematics.org/em-IRV/DefendantsDocs/11SuplementaryReplyMemoinSupportofMotionforSummaryJudgment.pdf
Thank you.
Kathy
--
[EMAIL PROTECTED] people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
