But Dave Ketchum's example is about how IRV can fail to elect a Condorcet winner. This candidate gets zero votes under plurality rules and is immediately eliminated under two-round runoff rules as well. Plurality and Two-round runoffs are the two systems the plaintiffs are seeking to preserve, while "constitutionally" prohibiting Condorcet (as well as IRV).
Terry Bouricius ----- Original Message ----- From: "Dave Ketchum" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[email protected]> Sent: Friday, November 07, 2008 10:09 PM Subject: Re: [EM] New MN court affidavits by those defending non-Monotonic voting methods & IRV/STV Perhaps this could get some useful muscle by adding such as: 9 B>A Now we have 34 voting B>A. Enough that they can expect to win and may have as strong a preference between these two as might happen anywhere. C and D represent issues many feel strongly about - and can want to assert to encourage action by B, the expected winner. If ONE voter had voted B>A rather than D>B>A, IRV would have declared B the winner. Note that Condorcet would have declared B the winner any time the B>A count exceeded the A>B count (unless C or D got many more votes). DWK On Fri, 7 Nov 2008 14:05:03 -0700 Kathy Dopp wrote: > Dave, > > I agree with you -that is important too, but the attorneys and > judge(s) have their own criteria for judging importance as compared to > existing laws. > > Your example IMO does show unequal treatment of voters, so perhaps > I'll include it as one of many ways to show how IRV unequally treats > voters and see if the attorneys use it or not. > > Thanks. > > Kathy > > On Fri, Nov 7, 2008 at 1:35 PM, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > wrote: > >>Topic below is monotonicity, which seems discardable as a side issue. >> >>Of more importance is IRV's NOT CARING whether more voters indicate >>preferring A>B or B>A - can even declare A the winner when a majority of >>voters prefer B of this pair. >> >>Example: >>20 A>B >>15 C>B>A >>10 D>B>A >> >>Here a majority prefer B>A, but C and D have a special attraction for >>some >>some minorities. >> >>DWK >> >>On Thu, 6 Nov 2008 11:23:39 -0700 Kathy Dopp wrote: >> >>>FYI, >>> >>>Defendants in the MN Case (who are promoting IRV and STV methods) have >>>just released new affidavits to the court that discuss Arrow's theorem >>>as supporting the case for IRV/STV and dismissing the importance of >>>IRV's nonmonotonicity. >>> >>>I posted three of these most recent affidavits of the defendants of >>>Instant Runoff Voting and STV here: >>> >>>http://electionmathematics.org/em-IRV/DefendantsDocs/ >>> >>>The first two docs listed are by Fair Vote's new expert witness. >>> >>>The third doc is by the Minneapolis, MN City attorney. >>> >>>The defendants characterize Arrow's theorem as proving that "there >>>exists no unequivocally satisfactory, or normatively appealing, voting >>>rule." and claim the "possibility of nonmonotonic results plagues ALL >>>potential democratic voting systems with 3 or more candidates unless a >>>dictatorial voting rule is adopted." >>> >>>I would appreciate it if any of you have time to read some of the >>>above three docs, particularly the third document by the attorney, and >>>give me your responses. >>> >>>FYI, the plaintiff's characterizes Arrow's theorem on p. 3 of this doc: >>> >>> >>>http://electionmathematics.org/em-IRV/DefendantsDocs/11SuplementaryReplyMemoinSupportofMotionforSummaryJudgment.pdf >>> >>>Thank you. >>> >>>Kathy -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
