On Tue, Nov 11, 2008 at 2:18 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > At 10:45 AM 11/10/2008, Raph Frank wrote: >> >> On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 3:32 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax >> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> > Is this complicated? Yes. Is it fair? Well, up to the election of the >> > last >> > candidate, yes, it is clearly fair. With the last candidate, the >> > election >> > effectively becomes the same as an instant runoff voting election, with >> > the >> > problems associated with that. >> >> I don't see why the last seat being filled is that much different from >> the others. The negative effects are always there, though because >> factions aren't quite solid coalitions in practice, PR-STV doesn't >> display the effects quite so much (maybe). > > Okay, sometimes it isn't the last seat. Rather than saying "last seat," I > should say, "up until the point where non-election eliminations begin."
I wouldn't consider when a candidate is elected an elimination. I assume that you mean "until a round where the lowest candidate is eliminated?" > Raph's approach, by the way, shows the weakness of study through constructed > examples. As he notes, "because factions aren't quite solid coalitions in > practice," which is like saying "because people aren't quite like > stereotypical caricatures of the party of the candidate they choose in a > single election to vote for," what is usually missing from examples is any > consideration of how realistic the example is. Right. However, examples like this clearly show a given effect. If there was some random inter-faction preferences, then it would make it harder to illustrate. It is a balance between clarity and realism. Also, another benefit of PR-STV over IRV is that the C faction can pick which of the A and B factions actually get elected. Ofc, if they hold a primary before the election and only run 1 candidate, then this effect is lost. However, this incentive is reduced if they think they might get more than 1 seat. > There is only one way to study election method performance, with any hope of > objectivity,, and that is utility analysis, the approach of Warren Smith. > The same kind of mistake could be made there: an artificial utility profile > might warp the results, but some of the simulations he's done do attempt to > generate, at the outset, reasonable utility profiles, perhaps using issue > distance in n-space. Ofc, Warren is still looking into make it work for multi-member elections. > [The A faction winner would] probably [be] A1, > *though we cannot tell without understanding the > preference strengths*.) However, A1 isn't the condorcet winner. An approval internal vote would pick A2. Ofc, in the near term, the primary would likely be plurality, so A1 would win. >> PR-STV will run as follows >> >> Quote = 35 (approx) > > The Droop Quota is 34. Yeah, I know, but the extra vote makes little difference (and I did say 'approx') > STV's problem is the same as that of IRV, it is in the candidate > eliminations. Any candidate elected before eliminations begin is clearly > legitimate. (This is *certain* if the Hare quota is being used, and quite > reasonable under the Droop quota.) Correct, and this is why CPO-STV is superior as it doesn't do any eliminations. > If the A1 and A3 voters "retaliate" by truncating, themselves, not a > problem. A1, A2, and A3, all members of the same faction, negotiate, on > behalf of their supporters, who is to win the faction's votes and thus a > seat, and, benefit that comes with it, they get to use up their last > remaining unassigned votes. In Asset systems I'd propose, they might choose > A4!, someone eligible but not on the ballot. So, PR-STV with Asset backup. All unused voting power could go to the first choice on the ballot. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
