At 10:45 AM 11/10/2008, Raph Frank wrote:
On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 3:32 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Is this complicated? Yes. Is it fair? Well, up to the election of the last
> candidate, yes, it is clearly fair. With the last candidate, the election
> effectively becomes the same as an instant runoff voting election, with the
> problems associated with that.
I don't see why the last seat being filled is that much different from
the others. The negative effects are always there, though because
factions aren't quite solid coalitions in practice, PR-STV doesn't
display the effects quite so much (maybe).
Okay, sometimes it isn't the last seat. Rather than saying "last
seat," I should say, "up until the point where non-election
eliminations begin." Scenarios can certainly be constructed where
there is a problem before the last seat. Normally, though, the first
eliminations are obviously reasonable. In IRV scenarios, *usually*,
the problem elimination (the one which drops the Condorcet winner) is
the last one. Hence my comment about "last seat."
Raph's approach, by the way, shows the weakness of study through
constructed examples. As he notes, "because factions aren't quite
solid coalitions in practice," which is like saying "because people
aren't quite like stereotypical caricatures of the party of the
candidate they choose in a single election to vote for," what is
usually missing from examples is any consideration of how realistic
the example is.
It's the old approach to considering election methods, part of the
"criterion" approach. Approval Voting -- by some definitions --
doesn't pass the majority criterion. Therefore, toss it in the trash.
Even if the Approval result is clearly the more just one, the
unifying one, resulting in significantly better overall voter
satisfaction. Even if the violated majority preference is quite weak
(which it must be for the majority criterion to be violated under Approval).
There is only one way to study election method performance, with any
hope of objectivity,, and that is utility analysis, the approach of
Warren Smith. The same kind of mistake could be made there: an
artificial utility profile might warp the results, but some of the
simulations he's done do attempt to generate, at the outset,
reasonable utility profiles, perhaps using issue distance in n-space.
For example, assume that 2 seats are being filled
A faction
16: A1>A2>A3
5: A2>A1>A3
14: A3>A2>A1
B faction
14: B1>B2>B3
5: B2>B1>B3
16: B3>B2>B1
C faction
30: C
A2 and B2 (and C) are the condorcet winners in their own factions.
This is truly a bizarre example, by the way. Yes, Raph noted the
problem. Rigid factions, no crossover, no independent voters.
With the above scenario, though, the first election is A1. The
factions have voted entirely within their own faction. (In the real
world, such a tight faction would internally agree, in separate
process, on a single candidate, probably A1, *though we cannot tell
without understanding the preference strengths*.)
So the faction totals are A:35, B:35, C:30. This would be a razor's
edge election if only one seat were being chosen.
Because of the rigid isolation within the factions, we have,
effectively, three IRV elections, one for each party. Hence the first
seat can pass over the faction's Condorcet winner, due to the low
first preference support for A2.
Eliminations have occurred prior to *any* seat being chosen.
And this shows why I've long proposed that the place to start with
election reform is outside the actual election process, but with
pre-election process. Choose and support Condorcet winners *before*
the election, using better election methods or, even better,
deliberative methods (such as FA/DP).
Theoretically, a political party (even more a "faction") should be
able to choose its own election process. If not, democracy has been
lost, only a surface sham remains.
PR-STV will run as follows
Quote = 35 (approx)
The Droop Quota is 34.
IRV run on the election is really three elections, collapsing a
primary into the final. Each faction elects its winner, the original
eliminations clearly do this first. Thus this particular election is,
in effect, a set of three factional elections, each choosing one
winner. And that is how the eliminations proceed. So, in this
constructed scenario, because IRV can pass over a Condorcet winner,
one of its flaws, the factional condorcet winners lose the initial
election. But the factions each get one rep except for the smallest one.
Thus the general result is fair, though I consider it unsatisfactory.
The lack of satisfaction is due to there being only two reps for
three roughly equal factions. Elect three reps, and see what you get.
Droop quota is 26.
A1, B1, and C are elected, no problem. Except, of course, for the
choice within each faction. This example shows why, if I were a party
leader, I'd strongly oppose eliminating party primaries to "save the
expense and hassle." (Okay, party primaries *at public expense* could
be eliminated, but, then, parties should remain free to choose their
own candidates. Not to choose who runs, but who carries the party
banner, who can be identified on the ballot as a candidate of a party
(rather than merely self-identified. If parties receive any
recognition on the ballot, though, the public has a right to demand
some kind of openness to the process, some way in which it can be
known how a candidate has received the party stamp of approval.
Parties could *choose* to run multiple candidates, of course, as they
would when there are enough seats up for grabs.)
STV's problem is the same as that of IRV, it is in the candidate
eliminations. Any candidate elected before eliminations begin is
clearly legitimate. (This is *certain* if the Hare quota is being
used, and quite reasonable under the Droop quota.)
(I.e., Hare quota winner has won 1/N of the votes in first
preference, and is thus clearly legitimate to, in an assembly,
represent 1/N of the assembly voting power. With the Droop quota, the
candidate has 1/N of the voting power but has received 1/(N+1) of the
votes, thus is exercising, possibly, some unearned edge of power.)
There are Asset Voting schemes which fix this, or certainly
ameliorate it. The method can be STV. With Asset Voting, the A2
voters, understanding their candidate's position, would vote only for
A2, perhaps. No A faction candidate would reach the quota, then,
without the approval of A2. Given that A2 is a unifying candidate
(assuming that the A1>A2 and A3>A2 preference strengths are weak,
what is likely is that either A2 accepts A1 as the winner,
considering this a reasonable result, by transferring those 5% of
votes, or A2 gains the votes of the A3 voters through elimination of
A3 and then A1.
If the A1 and A3 voters "retaliate" by truncating, themselves, not a
problem. A1, A2, and A3, all members of the same faction, negotiate,
on behalf of their supporters, who is to win the faction's votes and
thus a seat, and, benefit that comes with it, they get to use up
their last remaining unassigned votes. In Asset systems I'd propose,
they might choose A4!, someone eligible but not on the ballot.
Having spent 34 votes, the A faction still has a vote left, which can
be spent by the asset holder(s). In this case, there is nothing to
spend it on, but in some elections, it could make a difference in a
later election choice.
Asset voting, folks, was invented as a tweak to STV, back in the
1880s. It was a brilliant idea, from one brilliant polymath. Warren
Smith reinvented it and gave it the name Asset Voting, early this
century. It was previously mentioned by Mike Ossipoff on this mailing
list in the 1990s.
It is a variation, really, on Delegable Proxy, and Delegable Proxy,
when it comes to pass that vote assets are being held by many
candidates -- I expect that Asset Voting will lead to *massive*
numbers of "candidates," so many that a booklet will be published
with those eligible, through registration, to receive votes -- and
the registration fee will be, basically, the shared publication cost
to put a name in the booklet, i.e., *cheap*. Like a few dollars;
indeed, most of the cost would be, I think, in the cost of collecting
the fee and processing and confirming the registrations. Votes would,
then, be for candidate *number*, the number taken from the booklet
available with the ballot.
Ahem, that sentence did go on, didn't it. The end of it is: --
Delegable Proxy can be used by the asset holders to negotiate their
final vote transfers. That would be entirely voluntary, but if
intermediate transfers are recorded (and reversible are changeable,
up to the point where a binding decision is made), a functioning
Electoral College will have been created that can serve other
purposes as well. It would make Direct/Representative democracy
possible. It could unseat winners, creating an easy impeachment process.
(I've discussed the details many times; I've suggested that, when a
holder of a seat loses the confidence of his or her supporters, there
would be latency, where the seat holder has reduced voting power,
always having only the voting power of maintained supporters, but
would retain deliberative rights, i.e., to speak to the assembly and
enter motions. Thus a minor loss of vote support would only be that:
a minor loss of voting power. Not a drastic removal from office.)
Truly, the devil is in the details. For many, what happens with
exhausted ballots is an unimportant detail. The problem, on the face,
doesn't exist in STV as usually practiced in Australia, because full
ranking is mandatory. But that, by depriving voters of the freedom to
truncate (to decide that they are not willing to support any other
candidates than those they ranked), a basic democratic right has been
eliminated: the right to deprive a candidate of what they call in
Australia an absolute majority, resulting in election failure and
need for further process. Asset Voting provides an efficient way for
the further process to proceed without an expensive public election,
but only, effectively, a "runoff election" where the Asset holders
vote, in public. Given the nature of this body, reduced in size,
operating publicly, that "election" could really be a continuous process.
It would be exciting to watch, I'd think, to see as assigned votes
approach a quota. Today, this could be done on a web site; given that
votes are public, the security issues are minor. (Someone hacking and
presenting false votes would be quickly discovered, by the actual
asset holder! -- and, of course, before validating final results,
officials would make sure that the electors confirm what is recorded
for them.) The FA/DP process, if used by electors, would be advisory
only, the electors would directly vote whatever they choose, but
presumably as advised by their own chosen proxies in the FA process.
Let me emphasize this: this is a tweak on STV, remedying a problem
with STV that was first noticed by Lewis Carroll, and making it
unnecessary for voters to have sufficient knowledge to fully rank.
That, indeed, was his concern, that the "common voter" would be quite
likely to only know one thing well: their favorite. I don't know that
he realized that it could have a major impact beyond that, that it
could pretty much make the *need* for political parties obsolete.
They would still exist, I'm sure, but much more as voluntary
coordinating bodies than as necessities of the process. (STV in
Australian, say, would be pretty chaotic without the political
parties and their recommended preference lists, there would be lots
more "donkey voting.")
So I am hoping, in fact, that the defendants in the Minnesota case
prevail, even though it means that IRV will proceed in Minneapolis.
My opposition to IRV, which is strong, is not an absolute; if
Minneapolis wants to waste money and effort on a method that, in
practice, is little or no improvement over Plurality in nonpartisan
elections, and that has pretty much only one benefit in partisan
elections, the reduction of the spoiler effect, when there are other
reforms that are cheaper, simply, fairer, and which more completely
address the spoiler effect, that's their privilege. The sky will not
fall, Kathy. The country will not therefore shift to IRV in a
landslide. These are *city* offices being elected, not state ones, if
I'm correct.
As to top-two runoff, consider what would happen if top-two runoff
were tweaked with the Asset fix. Most runoffs would be avoided, there
would be a runoff only if the asset holders could not put together a
majority within a set period of time. There would be no eliminations
in that runoff, I'd assume, though it might be a plurality election.
Presto! Condorcet winners would be quite likely to prevail in the
runoff, or before. *Range winners* could beat Condorcet winners, when
they differ (which is rare). Think about it. Differential turnout
tests preference strength.
(The runoff would also be an Asset election, but with a tight time
limit for vote transfers. Enough to negotiate. The groundwork for the
negotiation would have been laid in the primary.)
The voters would see the same ballot as now. The only difference is
that no votes are wasted, except those cast foolishly for a candidate
who will waste them. TAANSTAAFL.
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