--- On Fri, 14/11/08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> From: Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: [email protected]
> Date: Friday, 14 November, 2008, 12:26 AM
> On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 10:11 PM, Juho Laatu
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > This party list based method actually allowed the
> party supporters not to be rock solid supporters of the
> party. Those 7 A2>B>A1 voters were able to indicate
> that they preferred B to A1. And their favourite still won.
>
> Hmm, it is IRV except but it uses a different elimination
> order. A
> candidate from the smallest party is eliminated first (and
> presumably
> the candidate from the party with the fewest votes if the
> party has
> more than 1 vote).
>
> I assume that the party totals are re-calculated after each
> elimination? That means that the largest party doesn't
> automatically
> win (as their candidates would be eliminated last)
Yes, that was my assumption in this method. After C was eliminated those votes
supported B. But that meant only 45 votes for B, which was this time not enough
against the 55 votes of the A party.
The A party candidates were just like one combined "A1+A2" candidate in a
regular IRV election until that candidate won. After that there was a second
race between the candidates of the A party.
This approach clearly encourages formation of parties or other
groupings/coalitions. If all candidates are either under a left wing or right
wing coalition the bigger of those coalitions will win. (Hierarchies of
groupings/parties/coalitions are possible too.)
This approach also encourages parties to nominate more than one candidate, as
in the example where the A party won thanks to nominating a good compromise
candidate (A2, that had less first place popularity than A1) that appealed also
to the A2>B>A1 voters that would have voted for B (making B the winner) if A2
would not have been available.
Juho
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