On Sat, Nov 15, 2008 at 8:36 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > The single-winner criterion corresponding to the DPC is the mutual majority > criterion. Any method that's Smith also passes mutual majority, and since > Condorcet is just the case of the Smith set being a singleton, any Condorcet > method passes the criterion when there's a CW.
Mutual majority looks the same as the Droop criterion, but for single winner cases. I wouldn't think much of a condorcet method that doesn't meet Smith, but the two criteria aren't the same. > But what would this multi-winner Condorcet criterion be? That's the > question. One may also ask whether it's a desirable criterion (like > Condorcet), or if it's too strict (like Participation). If the objective is to find a multi-winner equivalent of the condorcet criterion rather the Smith criterion, I am not so sure how useful that is. It would be a criterion that covers less cases than the Droop criterion. Maybe An outcome is not a valid outcome if there is any non-elected candidate who is preferred to all the winning candidates by a Droop quota of the voters. No invalid outcome may be used unless there are no valid outcomes. This would be similar to re-defining the condorcet criterion as A candidate shall be deemed an invalid winner if a majority prefer any other candidate to that candidate. An invalid candidate may not be declared the winner unless there are no valid candidates. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info