--- On Sat, 22/11/08, Greg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Perhaps intuitiveness is a bit in the eyes of the beholder, > but I'll > tell you the strategies I find intuitive: > > - Burying a candidate with strong first choice support
Yes. This is close to the case that I discussed. I didn't assume strong first choice support but just any strength (e.g. being close to a Condorcet winner). > - Bullet voting for a candidate with strong first choice > support Yes. (Also any other strength ok, or one could bullet vote one's own not-so-strong favourite.) > - A compromise in which you switch your first choice vote > to a > candidate who has stronger first choice support. Yes. (Again strong first choice support typical but not necessary.) > > From anecdotal personal experience, I actually think > burying might be > the most intuitive of them all. Yes, may be. > Almost every university > election I > voted for as an undergraduate used IRV. After each one, > there was > often a person here or there who claimed to have voted for > one > front-runner and buried the other front-runner on their > ballot, not > aware that this had no effect on the outcome. Now, as I go > around > teaching IRV to people, there's often some guy who > thinks he's clever > who brings up the idea of burying (though he doesn't > know the term > "bury"), thinking he's discovered some sort > of flaw; that is, until I > correct him. One problem (or actually a good thing) with strategies is that if there are strategies they may not always be rational. In such a situation hopefully we can recommend sincere voting to all voters as a better alternative to confused use of various strategies. > > It is from this personal experience that I have grown to > believe > resistance to burying essential. Again, this is purely > anecdotal, and > empirical research in this area would be helpful. It is very difficult to defend against widespread irrational use of strategies. Recommending sincere voting may be a good approach. (Maybe people will learn after spoiling some election and electing some clearly unwanted candidate as a result of burying all the reasonable competitors :-) .) Juho > > Greg > > > On Sat, Nov 22, 2008 at 5:53 AM, Juho Laatu > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Yes, it is not intuitive to abandon one's > favourite. What is then intuitive? Burying as a Condorcet > strategy is certainly not intuitive (quite difficult to > understand even to experts). Burying in the sense of ranking > the strongest competitor of one's favourite potential > winner last may be intuitive to many. > > > > Since in Condorcet there are some situations where > burying is a working strategy, this property (if advertised) > may encourage people to (irrationally) bury (or rank the > competitors last) even more generally. In IRV voters may > also intuitively bury although that doesn't make much > sense. > > > > In Condorcet one would thus have to trust > "political advisers" to tell when to bury (to make > the strategy rational). Similarly in the example that I gave > the voters would maybe have to be reminded that it could be > wise to compromise this time. > > > > > > > > Although all the three factions are large the B > supporters may see C as a spoiler. If C would not > participate both B and C supporters would be happier with > the outcome. (C thus spoils the result also from the C > supporters' point of view.) > > > > In the example B and C could be candidates of the same > party. Then nominating also C (the more extreme of the two > potential candidates) was maybe a mistake. > > > > Juho > > > > > > > > --- On Sat, 22/11/08, Greg > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > >> From: Greg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >> Subject: Re: [EM] Why I Prefer IRV to Condorcet > >> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >> Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > >> Date: Saturday, 22 November, 2008, 10:04 AM > >> Yes, this is as intuitive as it comes in terms of > IRV > >> strategy, but I > >> still find it ultimately counter-intuitive for the > average > >> voter. > >> Candidate C has a the second-most number of first > choices, > >> which > >> likely corresponds to the second-biggest campaign > >> (second-most amount > >> of money, volunteers, name recognition, exposure, > ads, > >> etc). The > >> thought of abandoning C in favor of B, who will > probably > >> have a > >> smaller campaign (less money, fewer volunteers, > etc), I > >> think will > >> strike the average voter as counter-intuitive. In > these > >> respects, this > >> scenario is quite unlike the standard spoiler > scenario, > >> where the > >> incentive is to intuitively switch one's vote > from the > >> smaller to the > >> bigger campaign. Nevertheless, I would agree that > it's > >> something to be > >> on the lookout for as IRV spreads. > >> > >> Greg > >> > >> > >> On Sat, Nov 22, 2008 at 2:00 AM, Juho Laatu > >> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> > Here's one IRV example with three strong > >> candidates and where voters do have some incentive > to > >> compromise. > >> > > >> > 45: A>B>C > >> > 10: B>A>C > >> > 15: B>C>A > >> > 30: C>B>A > >> > > >> > We have one centrist candidate (B) between > two others. > >> > > >> > According to this poll it seems that B will > be > >> eliminated first, and then A would win since some > B > >> supporters prefer A to C. > >> > > >> > If sufficient number of C supporters would > abandon > >> their favourite and vote B>C>A, then C would > be > >> eliminated first and the centrist candidate B > would be > >> elected. > >> > > >> > Based on this poll it seems that if C voters > don't > >> compromise (or if C will not withdraw) then from C > >> supporters' point of view the worst candidate > (A) will > >> be elected. > >> > > >> > - This situation could be reasonably common > (or > >> plausible) in real life > >> > - B is a Condorcet winner ((that IRV would > not elect)) > >> > - B seems to be politically closer to C than > to A > >> > - C is not a weak candidate since with few > more > >> "core" voters or second place support it > could > >> beat A (if the strong centrist candidate B will be > >> eliminated first) > >> > > >> > C supporters could be optimistic and hope for > a change > >> in opinions before the election day. I mean that > in real > >> elections many voters may be optimistic and > fighting > >> spirited and believe rather in those earlier polls > that gave > >> their favourite more votes than this poll etc. > >> > > >> > The strategy of the C voters is not very > >> "intuitive" in the sense that it is > never natural > >> to abandon one's favourite (it could be easier > e.g. to > >> rank the strongest competitor last even if that > would be an > >> irrational strategy). But on the other hand it is > quite > >> straight forward to see from the poll results > (maybe voiced > >> out by media) that indeed it makes sense for the C > >> supporters to give up and abandon C if people will > vote as > >> indicated in this poll. The voters will thus have > a dilemma, > >> whether to vote sincerely or whether to > compromise. > >> > > >> > Juho > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > --- On Sat, 22/11/08, Greg > >> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> > > >> >> From: Greg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >> >> Subject: Re: [EM] Why I Prefer IRV to > Condorcet > >> >> To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > >> >> Date: Saturday, 22 November, 2008, 3:06 > AM > >> >> Thanks, Chris. I'll correct the > errors and > >> rephrase some > >> >> things I > >> >> didn't say correctly. > >> >> > >> >> On the Compromise strategy, I think some > >> compromises are > >> >> more > >> >> intuitive than others. I think it's > intuitive > >> to > >> >> abandon a more weakly > >> >> supported candidate, e.g. Nader, in favor > of a > >> major > >> >> candidate, as is > >> >> common in FPTP. But it strikes me as more > >> >> counter-intuitive, at least > >> >> for the average voter, to abandon a > candidate with > >> strong > >> >> core support > >> >> in favor of a more weakly supported > candidate, as > >> could > >> >> happen under > >> >> IRV. Then there's the issue as to > whether the > >> result of > >> >> the > >> >> strategizing is a better or worse result > overall . > >> . . but > >> >> that's a > >> >> tricky topic for another time. > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2008 11:51:01 > -0800 (PST) > >> >> > From: Chris Benham > >> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >> >> > Subject: [EM] Why I Prefer IRV to > Condorcet > >> >> > > >> >> > Greg, > >> >> > I generally liked your essay. I rate > IRV as > >> the best > >> >> of the single-winner methods that > >> >> > meet Later-no-Harm, and a good > method (and a > >> vast > >> >> improvement on FPP). > >> >> > > >> >> > But I think you made a couple of > technical > >> errors. > >> >> > > >> >> > "However, because bullet voting > can help > >> and > >> >> never backfire against one's top > choice under > >> >> > Condorcet, expect every campaign > with a shot > >> at > >> >> winning to encourage its supporters to > >> >> > bullet vote. " > >> >> > > >> >> > Bullet voting can "backfire > against > >> one's top > >> >> choice under Condorcet" because > Condorcet > >> >> > methods, unlike IRV, fail > Later-no-Help. > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > >> > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/files/wood1996.pdf > >> >> > > >> >> > In this 1996 Douglas Woodall paper, > see > >> "Election > >> >> 6" and the accompanying discussion > on > >> >> > page 5/6 of the pdf (labelled on the > paper as > >> >> "Page 13"). > >> >> > > >> >> > Quoting again from your paper: > >> >> > "As mentioned, every voting > system is > >> >> theoretically vulnerable to strategic > >> manipulation, and IRV > >> >> > is no exception. However, under IRV, > there is > >> no > >> >> strategy that can increase the likelihood > of > >> >> > electing one's first choice > beyond the > >> opportunity > >> >> offered by honest rankings. While there > are > >> >> > strategies for increasing the > chances of less > >> >> preferred candidates under IRV, like > push-over, > >> >> > they are counter-intuitive." > >> >> > > >> >> > The Push-over strategy is certainly > not > >> limited to > >> >> improving the chance of electing a > "lower > >> >> > [than first] choice". Say > sincere is: > >> >> > > >> >> > 49: A? > >> >> > 27: B>A > >> >> > 24: C>B > >> >> > > >> >> > B is the IRV winner, but if? 4-21 > (inclusive) > >> of the A > >> >> voters change to C or C>? then the > winner > >> >> > changes to A. > >> >> > > >> >> > But as you say the strategy > isn't > >> >> "intuitive" , and backfires if > too many > >> of the A > >> >> supporters try it. > >> >> > Some IRV opponents claim to like > Top-Two > >> Runoff, but > >> >> that is more vulnerable to Push-over > >> >> > than IRV (because the strategists > can support > >> their > >> >> sincere favourite in the second round). > >> >> > > >> >> > The quite intuitive strategy that > IRV is > >> vulnerable to > >> >> is Compromise, like any other method that > >> >> > meets Majority. But voters' > incentive to > >> >> compromise (vote one's front-runner > >> lesser-evil in first > >> >> > place to reduce the chance of > front-runner > >> >> greater-evil winning) is generally vastly > vastly > >> less > >> >> > than it is under FPP. > >> >> > > >> >> > (There are methods that meet both > Majority > >> and > >> >> Favourite Betrayal, and in them > compromisers > >> >> > can harmlessly vote their sincere > favourites > >> in > >> >> equal-first place.) > >> >> > > >> >> > But some Condorcet advocates are > galled? by > >> the > >> >> Compromise incentive that can exist where > >> >> > there is a sincere CW who is not > also a > >> sincere Mutual > >> >> Dominant Third winner. > >> >> > > >> >> > 49: A>B > >> >> > 02: B>A > >> >> > 22: B > >> >> > 27: C>B > >> >> > > >> >> > On these votes B is the CW, but IRV > elects > >> A.? If the > >> >> C>B voters change to B then B will be > >> >> > the voted majority favourite, so of > course > >> IRV like > >> >> Condorcet methods and FPP will elect B. > >> >> > > >> >> > Chris Benham > >> >> ---- > >> >> Election-Methods mailing list - see > >> >> http://electorama.com/em for list info > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info