Hallo, Juho Laatu wrote (28 Nov 2008):
> I didn't quite get this. When evaluating > candidate X minmax just checks if voters > would be interested in changing X to some > other candidate (in one step), while > methods like Schulze and Ranked Pairs may > base their evaluation on chains of victories > leading to X. Suppose the MinMax score of a set Y of candidates is the strength of the strongest win of a candidate A outside the set Y against a candidate B inside the set Y. Then the Schulze method (but not the Ranked Pairs method) guarantees that the winner is always chosen from the set with minimum MinMax score. See section 9 of my paper: http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze1.pdf Because of this reason, the worst pairwise defeat of the Schulze winner is usually very weak. And, in most cases, the Schulze winner is identical to the MinMax winner. This has been confirmed by Norman Petry and Jobst Heitzig (with different models): http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2000-November/004540.html http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-May/012801.html Markus Schulze ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info