On Dec 2, 2008, at 3:25 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:

Paul Kislanko wrote:

I agree with almost all of what Jonathan says except that "as a voter" (and that's my main perspective) I _CAN_ see a need for equal rankings in a
method that requests my ordinal list of alternatives.
A>B=C=D=...>V>W=...X=Y=Z
fairly precisely expresses what I was thinking when I voted. "Of the
lower-alphabet alternatives I prefer A, but if A doesn't win I prefer any of
the other top-alphabet alternatives to all of the lower-alphabet
alternatives, of which I prefer V to any of the others that I find equally
distastefull."
One can (and folks on this list often do) describe the > between one set of =s and another as an "approval cutoff", but that is unnecessay if you have
fully ranked ballots with equal ranks allowed. From such collection
mechanisms one can count ballots by pretty much any method, which is why "as a voter" I prefer a vote-COLLECTION method that allows ranked ballots with equal ranks and truncation allowed, regardless of how votes are COUNTED.

That's not really what an approval cutoff is. An approval cutoff is used by some methods to denote "the candidates above are those I can accept; those below, I really don't like". At least that's what I understand, though some methods may reward strategic placement of the cutoff as well.

Abd's point, and mine, is that such interpretations of some "approval cutoff" isn't really justified, except perhaps as a shorthand way of describing how a voter *might* behave. The only instructions a voter is bound by the rules to follow are "vote for as many as you choose; the candidate with the most vote wins".

Assuming that the voter a preference ranking, the decision as to where to place the cutoff is inherently a strategic decision. Obviously I should vote for my favorite candidate. It's also obvious that if, for whatever reason, I vote for candidate X, I should vote for all the candidates that I prefer to X. What's not obvious is where to place the cutoff. Making that calculation optimally, especially in the light of imprecise polling, is difficult to impossible.
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