At 06:25 AM 12/2/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
That's not really what an approval cutoff is. An approval cutoff is used by some methods to denote "the candidates above are those I can accept; those below, I really don't like". At least that's what I understand, though some methods may reward strategic placement of the cutoff as well.
They must, actually. I.e., the voter may have some absolute and sincere thought, "I won't accept anyone but my favorite." But if the voter knows that sticking with this will make their vote moot, they must compromise somehow. And, by definition, this compromise is "strategic."
I haven't seen the idea mentioned before my recent posts, but a question that a voter might ask themselves is "Which would I prefer, to elect this candidate or to see a runoff take place under the rules? If the voter would prefer to elect the candidate, the voter's shift in approval cutoff that might result is a sincere answer to the question.
"Strategic" could be translated as "With consideration of the overall desires and welfare of the entire electorate, together with my personal preferences." In other words, "strategic" isn't bad. It distorts votes, however, and we'd prefer to encourage maximally accurate voting, because a good voting method can then truly optimize the result, *but* prohibiting or trying to prevent strategic voting could have the opposite of the desired effect, i.e., it could make results worse, not better. Remember, DSV can improve Range results. And so can honest voting. Indeed, I don't know the details of the DSV simulations, but if I recall my reading of the paper correctly, honest voters had the option of directing the automatic strategic voter to not optimize their vote. I don't know what mix of voters doing or not doing this was used, or how full-DSV -- every voter optimized -- compares to honest Range. (Again, "honest" here means accurate utility expression, which is, after all, not necessarily easy! It would mean that any significant preference is expressed, and that preference strengths were also expressed, which is the hard part. I've assumed that they are not expressed with full accuracy, that many Range Voters, intending to vote sincerely, will essentially vote a Borda ballot. equal preference strengths, or something close, unless there are very few candidates. They would also shift their votes to the positive half or negative half, which will likewise make preference strengths more accurate.
But I don't expect voters to wire themselves up to a polygraph and measure their emotional responses to candidates. We do not need fully accurate votes, as long as they are approximately right, because the votes will be averaged, effectively, over many voters.
(I'm truly warming up to positive/negative Range, with the default vote being midrange, i.e, 0, with max being +N and min being -N. Conceptually, it is much easier to understand. Range 2 is a piece of cake. (And, in that simple a method, 0 means "accept but not prefer and not strongly reject" ... In higher Range, the Accept level can be set off from zero.)
The odd thing is that no party has actually done that. If using Approval would let a party pick a candidate that's more likely to be accepted by thevoters, then why wouldn't they? They could only gain. The same holds if what the parties are really interested in is finding candidates at +/-0.5, not +/-0.001 - a better election method would let them do so more consistently, which would give a better result (to them).
It's an interesting argument, with some merit, that it's a bad idea because nobody is doing it. However, Approval has been used for a long time. The Venetian Republic survived for 700 years, and used it as part of their election process for the Doge.
There is another explanation: existing leaders got their positions under the existing system. Make the system better, it destabilizes the power structure, there will be some changes. People don't like change that may take some power away from them, on average. (And, legitimately, they can be afraid that a newly empowered membership may make decisions unwisely, being inexperienced.)
The big obstacle to decent election reform is not, however, those who cogently oppose it. It is inertia and lack of interest. Until things get really bad, most people don't even think of change. They have other things to worry about. Many, many special interests benefit, at least they think they do, from the status quo. (That's not surprising and is not a condemnation of them; indeed, they are *adapted* to the status quo, they evolved to be able to use it and to benefit from it.)
But a rising tide raises all boats. In fact, better democratic methods will avoid such nasty phenomena as violent revolutions, class warfare, confiscatory tax structures, etc. They will *incorporate* the best of what exists, and not drastically remove power from those who have some legitimacy in exercising it. They will *use* the experience of the people who have been in control, they won't pull a Cultural Revolution and beat them, humiliate them, and send them to dig weeds. It does not harm society if some people have more wealth than others, it can benefit it, if the wealth is justly obtained and used. But neither should any special interest be allowed to harm the society as a whole in order to pursue its special interest.
Special interests are an essential part of the system, and will remain so. What is needed is only balance.
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