Gervase Lam wrote:
Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2008 10:53:36 +0100
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
Sorry. I have not been following this lengthy thread carefully. Just
been taking in the bits that I find 'interesting.'
most PR systems have a threshold (either
implicit or explicit). Perhaps real world implementation of Condorcet
systems would have a "first preference" threshold, either on candidates
or on sets: anyone getting less than x% FP is disqualified.
Either that or have IRV with a different candidate elimination method
(i.e. not the one with the least number of top votes)? I dunno.
Or, as someone else proposed, a Condorce method where A > B, for all B,
is weighted to some multiple if A is the first preference.
For instance,
49: Faction A controls nation > Compromise > Faction B controls nation
48: Faction B controls nation > Compromise > Faction A controls nation
2: Compromise > Faction A controls nation = Faction B controls nation
That's kinda contrived, but if either A or B wins, there'll be big trouble.
Doesn't this depend on how good Compromise is? It is impossible to tell
just from the above.
I was considering an unstable nation where the A and B groups want to
destroy each other. Even if the compromise is a near standstill, it's
better than having a war.
Still, your point is taken. The problem with ordinal methods is that you
can't specify strength; but that's also, in some sense, an advantage,
since that means the method is less prone to being tricked by noise or
by optimization. Which matters more is a question of perspective and
what you want out of the method.
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