One problem is nobody really has a good understanding of what good strategy is.
If one believes that range voting becomes approval voting in the presence of strategic voters (often, anyhow)... One might similarly speculate that strategic voters in a system such as Schilze beatpaths ALLOWING ballots with both > and = (e.g. A>B=C=D>E=F is a legal ballot) usually the strategic vote is "approval style" i.e. of form A=B=C>D=E=F, say, with just ONE ">". One might then speculate that Schulze, just like range, then becomes equivalent to approval voting for strategic voters. Well... how true or false is that? Is Schulze with approval-style ballots a better or worse voting system than plain approval? How true is it that approval-style voting is "strategic" for Schulze? I'd like to hear people's ideas on this question. (And not necessarily just for "Schulze" -- substitute other methods too, if you prefer.) The trouble is, range voting is simple. Simple enough that you can reach a pretty full understanding of what strategic range voting is. (Which is not at all trivial, but it can pretty much be done.) In contrast, a lot of Condorcet systems including Schulze are complicated. Complicated enough that making confident statements about their behavior with strtagic voters (or even undertsnading what strtagy IS) is hard. Frankly, I've heard various vague but confident claims about strategy for Schulze & the like, and my impression is those making the claims know very little about what they are talking about. I also know very little on this, the difference is I admit it :) -- Warren D. Smith http://RangeVoting.org <-- add your endorsement (by clicking "endorse" as 1st step) and math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
