On Nov 16, 2009, at 2:15 PM, Andrew Myers wrote:

> Jonathan Lundell wrote:
>> This is in part Arrow's justification for dealing only with ordinal (vs 
>> cardinal) preferences in the Possibility Theorem. Add may label it 
>> preposterous, but it's the widely accepted view. Mine as well.
> Arrow's Theorem seems like a red herring in the context of the cardinal vs. 
> ordinal debate. IIA makes just as much sense when applied to range voting as 
> it does to ranked voting. Arrow was just making a simplifying assumption and 
> I don't see that it makes his results lose  generality.

I don't have his proof in front of me (I'm on the road), but I'm pretty sure 
that it assumes ordinal ranking.

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