On Sun, Jan 17, 2010 at 1:54 PM, Terry Bouricius <[email protected]> wrote: > Kathy, > > You still have it wrong. You wrote "To clarify, what I meant to say is > that in Burlington, the IRV winner > was the worst choice of a majority of voters *out of the three candidates > who were viable*."
Yes. Sorry. Of the two strongest candidates then. You're right. Thanks for the correction. Kathy > > No, among the top three the IRV winner, Kiss, was not less preferred than > Wright. Both Kiss and Montroll were preferred by more voters over Wright. > Among the "three candidates who were viable" it was the first round > plurality leader, Wright, who was the Condorcet-loser, not Kiss. > > The real world choice in Burlington today is between plurality and IRV. > You have stated, that in this case you prefer Plurality, which allows the > Condorcet-loser to be declared the winner. I agree that there is a > powerful intellectual case for a Condorcet solution, but that is not on > the table (even though I helped Robert Bristow-Johnson try to get it into > the hopper for consideration.) Condorcet, so far, has not been able to get > any traction with folks in Burlington, or in any other jurisdiction in the > world. > > Condorcet advocates may want to focus their attention on Aspen, where the > risk is that ranked ballots may be abandoned, if IRV is repealed. > Promoting Condorcet as an alternate direction to go there seems to be a > natural for advocates. > > Terry Bouricius > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Kathy Dopp" <[email protected]> > To: "Terry Bouricius" <[email protected]> > Cc: <[email protected]> > Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2010 1:38 PM > Subject: Re: [EM] Fw: Two simple alternative voting methods that are > fairerthan IRV/STV and lack most IRV/STV flaws > > > On Sun, Jan 17, 2010 at 12:34 PM, Terry Bouricius > <[email protected]> wrote: >> Kathy, >> >> you wrote<snip> >> "...unlike with IRV where a majority may think that the >> elected candidate is the worst choice, as happened in Burlington, VT >> mayoral election." > > To clarify, what I meant to say is that in Burlington, the IRV winner > was the worst choice of a majority of voters *out of the three > candidates who were viable*. There are many other voting methods that > do not share that flaw with IRV/STV. In fact do any alternatives to > plurality share that IRV/STV flaw? > >> <snip> >> That is incorrect for Burlington, (the IRV winner was the "second" >> Condorcet-winner if the actual Condorcet-winner is removed, and favored >> above the other three candidates.) And it is a fundamental fact that the >> IRV winner can never be a candidate that the majority think "is the >> worst >> choice." IRV can never elect the Condorcet-loser. The ultimate winner >> must >> be preferred above the other finalist in the last round of the tally. >> >> It is PLURALITY voting, which you support, that often DOES elect the >> Condorcet-loser, who a majority agree is the worst choice. > > You are distorting the facts again Terry. If you want to know what I > support, ask or read my posts. I clearly support plurality if the > choice is between IRV/STV and plurality because IRV/STV are *much > worse* than plurality in a variety of ways. However, given the choice > between plurality and virtually any other alternative voting method > I've heard proposed on this list, I support the alternatives. > > Please try to stop making personal attacks and distorting the facts > about people, whenever the facts on the issues are not on your side. > It's not pretty Terry. > > Kathy > >> >> Terry Bouricius >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: "Kathy Dopp" <[email protected]> >> To: "Chris Benham" <[email protected]>; "EM" >> <[email protected]> >> Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2010 8:38 AM >> Subject: Re: [EM] Fw: Two simple alternative voting methods that are >> fairerthan IRV/STV and lack most IRV/STV flaws >> >> >> Hi Chris, >> >> I respond to your claims below. >> >> On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 11:23 PM, Chris Benham <[email protected]> >> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ----- Forwarded Message ---- >>> From: Chris Benham <[email protected]> >>> To: EM <[email protected]> >>> Sent: Fri, 15 January, 2010 4:21:31 AM >>> Subject: Two simple alternative voting methods that are fairer than >>> IRV/STV and lack most IRV/STV flaws >>> >>> Kathy Dopp wrote (11 Jan 2010): >>> >>> <snip> >>> >>> "IRV/STV is fundamentally unfair because a large group of persons whose >>> first choice loses, never has their 2nd choice counted, unlike some >>> other voters. It's a highly inequitable method." >>> >>> <snip> >>> >>> Kathy Dopp wrote (13 Jan 2010): >>> >>> "For those who need a system for substituting for a top-two runoff >>> election, I devised two fair methods to suggest to her that do not >>> have all the flaws of IRV/STV. (They both may've been devised by >>> others before me. My goal was to create a fair method without >>> IRV/STV's flaws which solve the problem of one person/one vote which >>> is necessary to get a voting method approved by US courts. >>> ------------------------------------------ >>> >>> I believe that these >>> alternative systems (below) are also susceptible to the spoiler effect >>> of a nonwinning candidate changing who wins the election, although I >>> believe that there is a significant difference between the alternative >>> methods below and plurality and IRV where a majority opposed candidate >>> may win the election. In other words, I believe that the winner due to >>> a spoiler in the alternative method below is more likely to be a >>> majority >>> favorite." >>> >>> >>> If "majority opposed" means having a majority-strength pairwise loss, >>> then there is no decisive method that assures that no such candidate >>> can win. >> >> You could be right on that statement Chris. I wasn't thinking about >> all the possibilities when I wrote the above. >> >>> >>> I'm not sure what Kathy means by a "majority favorite". That phrase is >>> usually taken to refer to a candidate that is strictly top-ranked by >>> more >>> than half the voters. The "Majority Favorite" criterion is met by IRV >>> and >>> Plurality among many others, but not by Borda or Range. >> >> Sorry. I should use the phrase Condorcet winner for what I mean. >> >>> >>> >>> "Both methods below solve the problem of every voter having a vote of >>> value one and, unlike IRV, treat all voters alike by counting all >>> their choices >>> >>> So, here are two possible methods that are fairer than IRV/STV and >>> which are monotonic (unlike IRV/STV): >>> >>> 1. A rank choice ballot method: >>> >>> Any number of candidates may be running for office and any number >>> allowed to be ranked on the ballot. >>> >>> Voter ranks one candidate vote =1 >>> >>> Voter ranks two candidates, denominator is 1+2 = 3 >>> votes are worth 2/3 and 1/3 for first and second ranked candidates >>> >>> Voter ranks three candidates, denominator is 1+2+3=6 >>> votes are worth 3/6 and 2/6 and 1/6 for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd choice >>> respectively >>> >>> Voter ranks four candidates, denominator is 1+2+3+4=10 >>> votes are worth 4/10, 3/10, 2/10, and 1/10 for 1st, 2nd, and 3rd and >>> 4th choice respectively >>> >>> ETC. Just follow the same pattern" >>> >>> 51: A>B >>> 40: B >>> 09: C>A >>> >>> >>> A: (51 x 2/3 = 34) + (9 x 1/3 = 3) = 37. >>> B: (40 x 1 = 40) + (51 x 1/3 = 17) = 57 >>> C: (9 x 2/3) = 6. >>> >>> Kathy's proposed point score method here elects B in violation of >>> Majority Favourite. >> >> Yes. But also notice that B is also a majority favorite in that 91 >> voters out of 100 prefer B over C and 40/100 prefer B strongly enough >> to bullet vote, so the vast majority of voters should be happy with >> this result, unlike with IRV where a majority may think that the >> elected candidate is the worst choice, as happened in Burlington, VT >> mayoral election. >> >>> >>> Also of course if the A supporters had not ranked B then A would >>> have won, a big violation of Later-no-Harm. >> >> Later-no-harm is a very bad feature of IRV that prevents IRV from >> finding majority-favorite compromise candidates and tends to elect >> extreme right or extreme left candidates. In any negotiation, it is >> necessary to reveal the 2nd choices of all parties early on, not hide >> 2nd choices entirely of some voters and never consider them at all >> like IRV does to most voters in many elections. >> >>> >>> >>> "2. A point system where a total number of points per voter per contest >>> may be allocated by the voter to any of the candidates running for >>> office: >>> >>> Two candidates running for office, give all voters 2+1=3 votes to >>> cast. They may cast all three votes for one candidate or split the >>> votes any way between the two. >>> >>> Three candidates running for office, give all voters 3+2+1=6 votes to >>> cast. They may cast all six votes for one candidate or split the votes >>> any way they like between the three. >>> >>> Four candidates running for office, give all voters 4+3+2+1=10 votes >>> to cast. They may cast all ten votes for one candidate or split the >>> votes any way they like between the four. >>> >>> Five candidates running for office, give all voters 5+4+3+2+1=15 votes >>> to cast. They may cast all 15 votes for one candidate or split the >>> votes any way they like." >>> >>> This is effectively the same thing as the single-winner Cumulative >>> Vote, >>> and is likewise strategically equivalent to Plurality, but allowing >>> voters >>> to unwisely split up their votes mean that it also fails Majority >>> Favorite. >> >> Yes. *Any* system that guarantees the principle of >> "one-person/one-vote" as some US judges insist on, has the feature >> that it encourages bullet voting. Notice that with IRV and some other >> systems like Condorcet there is a wide variety on the number of votes >> that voters may cast and have counted during the election. In >> Condorcet, the voter may determine how many votes are cast and >> counted. In IRV the voter determines how many votes are cast, but not >> how many are counted since votes are not treated equally in IRV/STV. >> >>> >>> 51: A2, B1, C0 >>> 40: B3, A0, C0 >>> 09: C2, A1, B0 >>> >>> A: (51 x 2 = 104) + (9 x 1 = 9) = 113 >>> B: (40 x 3 = 120) + (51 x 1 = 51) = 171 >>> C: (9 x 2) = 18. >>> >>> >>> "The advantage of these two methods over IRV/STV include: >>> >>> 1. easy to count, precinct-summable (unlike IRV) >>> >>> 2. fair, treats all voters' votes equally by counting all choices of >>> each voter (unlike IRV)" >>> >>> I think judgements of "fair" (and "equitable") or not of a voting >>> method >>> should be based on their possible results, and not on some (presumably >>> just aesthetic) prejudice about its algorithm. >> >> By "fair" I mean that all votes are treated equally for all voters. >> I.e. all voters' 2nd choices would be counted equally. Because >> IRV/STV are not fair, they disenfranchise some voters and produce >> undesirable election results that a majority of voters oppose and >> involuntarily prevent some voters from participating in the final >> decision-making in the final round, etc. >> >>> >>> "3. gives each voter a total of one vote total over the entire vote >>> counting process satisfying the US courts (unlike IRV)" >>> >>> If IRV doesn't satisfy the US courts, then how come IRV is used in the >>> US? >> >> Because the judges have been cleverly and grossly misled on the facts, >> as they were in the most recent MN court case by FairVote. Also, the >> attorney who spoke for the plaintiff was not very educated on all the >> facts about IRV/STV, having also been misled by defendants, and should >> have let the attorney who did all the research for the firm speak >> instead. >> >>> >>> "4. is monotonic -- preserves the right to cast a vote that has a >>> positive affect on a candidate's chances of winning (unlike IRV.) >>> >>> 5. Allows all voters to participate in all the rounds since these >>> methods require only one (1) round (unlike IRV)". >>> >>> <snip> >>> >>> I am sure the majority of voters whose favourite was A in my examples >>> would be very pleased that they were "allowed to participate in all the >>> rounds". >> >> The majority of voters whose favorite was A and whose 2nd choice was B >> (you cleverly neglect to mention here) should have been very happy >> that C did not win, as would have happened in IRV/STV (you also >> neglect to mention.) >> >>> >>> Is being "monotonic" more important than satisfying Majority Favorite? >> >> Your definition of "majority favorite" of course conveniently only >> considers a voters' first choice votes and only considers the first >> choice votes of voters whose candidates make it to the final counting >> rounds. >> >> All US jurisdictions who've adopted IRV/STV have had to drop their >> requirement for majority winners when majority is defined, as it is in >> common parlance, by a majority out of all voters who cast ballots in >> the election. In Australia that may be different because Australia >> may be able to require that voters fully rank all candidates. US law >> does not permit that. >> >>> >>> Why does Kathy elsewhere defend Top Two Runoff which isn't monotonic? >> >> Another highly misleading statement. In Top-two runoff each election >> is monotonic and voters thus retain the right to cast a vote that >> increases, rather than decreases, the chance of their candidates' >> winning, unlike IRV/STV which removes this right, among others. >> >> Cheers, >> >> Kathy >> >>> >>> >>> Chris Benham >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Kathy Dopp >> >> Town of Colonie, NY 12304 >> phone 518-952-4030 >> cell 518-505-0220 >> >> http://utahcountvotes.org >> http://electionmathematics.org >> http://kathydopp.com/serendipity/ >> >> Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting >> http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf >> >> Voters Have Reason to Worry >> http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf >> >> Checking election outcome accuracy --- Post-election audit sampling >> http://electionmathematics.org/em-audits/US/PEAuditSamplingMethods.pdf >> ---- >> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >> info >> >> > > > > -- > > Kathy Dopp > > Town of Colonie, NY 12304 > phone 518-952-4030 > cell 518-505-0220 > > http://utahcountvotes.org > http://electionmathematics.org > http://kathydopp.com/serendipity/ > > Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting > http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf > > Voters Have Reason to Worry > http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf > > Checking election outcome accuracy --- Post-election audit sampling > http://electionmathematics.org/em-audits/US/PEAuditSamplingMethods.pdf > > -- Kathy Dopp Town of Colonie, NY 12304 phone 518-952-4030 cell 518-505-0220 http://utahcountvotes.org http://electionmathematics.org http://kathydopp.com/serendipity/ Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf Voters Have Reason to Worry http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf Checking election outcome accuracy --- Post-election audit sampling http://electionmathematics.org/em-audits/US/PEAuditSamplingMethods.pdf ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
