At 12:52 AM 1/18/2010, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
yes, it's debatable and, since there are 3 different methods all lifting up different declared winners, it's subjective.
Well, it's subjective without preference strength information. With that information, an objective assessment is possible.
Condorcet analysis is also objective from IRV ballot data, provided there is no widespread strategic voting, i.e., preference reversal. While in some situations, there is room for debate over whether or not the Condorcet winner is ideal, that doesn't apply to Burlington. We know that Montrose would win in a direct contest with each of the other candidates, there isn't any doubt about that, and the margin would be large.
We also know that the overall first-preference strength is such that there are three major parties, with the Democrats in the center, which means that Republicans generally prefer the Democrat over the Progressive, and the Progressives generally prefer the Democrat over the Republican. And the Democrats are divided, some preferring the Republican over the Progressive, some the Progressive over the Republican. Classic center squeeze situation, because, with it, the middle party tends to shrink a bit and become the smallest of the top three parties. The Burlington election problem last year is not rare, when there are three major parties.
While it's possible to assert that no-first-preference candidates shouldn't win (and I strongly disagree with this, even if it were ever the case in reality), this is a red herring that FairVote raises, they are desperate to find voting systems criteria that IRV satisfies and competing methods don't. In reality here, as to first preference, there are three parties which are *roughly* equal in first preference strength.
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