At 09:07 AM 1/25/2010, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Would we agree that voting methods do best when voters give their sincere rankings to avoid GIGO distortion?
Depends on the method! There is a hidden assumption, as well, which is that "voting methods do best" with *only* sincere ranking information that neglects preference strength. And obviously they don't, and it is easy to see by comparison with scenarios where the assumptions of ranked preferences run up against blatant and significant differences in preference strength, and particularly where preference strength can be objectively assessed.
Since all voting methods can be subject to strategic voting strategies with incomplete, exaggerated or insincere ballot information, might it not be a good idea to select two or more voting methods with different (ideally contrary) inherent strategy options, and then select the vote tabulation algorithm by lot AFTER the ballots are cast? This might give all voters an incentive to give sincere ballot information, since that would be the safest individual strategy.
This, taken to the implications, would suggest collecting information with a range ballot of sufficient resolution, but not determining the "canvassing" method except through deliberative process after the election. In fact, with a separate ballot, include an Asset Voting election of a three-member apportionment committee. As soon as two members of that committee are elected (use the Hare quota), the committee may begin analysis and room assignments wherever the two that elected agree, and we can assume extended discussion continues to advise the committee among those receiving votes but which votes are not yet allocated to a seat on the committee. In other words, a decision-making body is created when two-thirds of the electorate has settled on representation, with full representation still available to everyone else through what I've called the "electoral college."
A range ballot, of course, may be analyzed as a ranked ballot.
Alternatively, the threat of assigning all offices by lot might be used as a stick to prompt all voters to come to a unanimous agreement using an iterative or "bidding" process.
Sure. Though "unanimous" can be too strong a requirement. Above, I suggest that a two-thirds agreement is adequate, and means are provided to improve assignment satisfaction over even that.
The claim that "voting methods can be subject to strategic voting with incomplete, exaggerated or insincere ballot information" is highly misleading.
Basically, there are methods, Terry must know, that never reward "insincere" ballot information. However, it is easily alleged that they can reward "exaggerated" information. However, "exaggerated" is undefined, and implies some motivation to distort, say, sincere ratings. But a motivation to distort must be sincere or it makes no sense.
Suppose I supposedly "really" approve of both A and B, and disapprove of C. However, perhaps I do have some preference between A and B. Is my approval vote for A and B therefore "insincere or exaggerated?" What my approval of both indicates is a some willingness to compromise. Is this willingness "insincere"? Is it "exaggerated" or is, instead, it "incomplete information." The answer is that, of course, it's incomplete information. But A>B>C is also incomplete information.
A range ballot with sufficient resolution is actually complete information. What resolution is required? I have no doubt but that Range 100 is adequate or more than adequate in most real situations. (ratings of 0-100).
That is, the voter can express preference order, and only represses it when it is "insignificant." But the voter also provides preference strength information. A Borda ballot was suggested because it simplifies, and voters might even simply vote a Range ballot as if it were Borda, spreading out the ratings, but then collapsing them when the voter doesn't care about two choices, the difference between them.
If a voter votes 100% for the favorite room, 50% for all rooms considered acceptable, and only 0% for rooms that would be actively disliked, that's a quite expressive ballot, sincere. But if the voter looks at it and thinks that this isn't really accurate, that, say, there is a second-best room that the voter wants to be considered before the rest of the acceptable rooms, the voter can elevate the rating of that room, etc.
"Exaggerated" actually is based on a misunderstanding. In the situation described, rooms to be allocated, and now being considered for allocation by a voting system, the best strategy for the voter is to accurately rate the rooms, for every "exaggeration" undervalues other choices, which might turn out to be, for the voter, the critical ones.
This actually applies to Range Voting in general, and the only fly in the ointment is that Range Voting, like Instant Runoff Voting, is a plurality method that does not test for majority approval. It's easy to fix, in fact, with iteration, and it's likely that a single iteration is enough in almost all situations, provided that a method of adequate power is used in the "primary."
Regardless of majority approval, a range ballot would provide sufficient information for an apportionment committee to maximize the relevant concerns, including overall satisfaction with results, appropriate reward for seniority, the needs of students, etc.
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