> Consider the following votes: > > 34 A > 33 B>C > 33 C>B. > > The Condorcet winner is A, because in the two pairwise elections involving > A, A wins > > A>B, 34:33 > A>C, 34:33. >
Huh? I count 66 voters who prefer either B or C over A. Change it up: 49 A 26 B>C 25 C>B Now the CW is B. In the C vs. B competition, 26 pro-B voters beat 25 anti and 49 indifferent voters. This is arguably problematic, but not nearly as pathological as the original example would have been if true. The pro-(BC) coalition has decided the relative worth of B and C, while the A voters have abstained on that question.
---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
