At 01:45 PM 2/11/2010, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
34 A
33 B>C
33 C>B.
The Condorcet winner is A, because in the two pairwise elections
involving A, A wins
A>B, 34:33
A>C, 34:33.
Oops. Of course, A is the Condorcet loser. I added the second
preferences as an afterthought. I meant
34 A
33 B
33 C
But more examples could be constructed where there is deeper ranking.
Why bother, though?
Condorcet methods, like any deterministic single-ballot method, is a
plurality method, unless voters are coerced into voting for
candidates they do not wish to be responsible for supporting, as with
mandatory full ranking.
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