Chris wrote: > > 35:A>B=C > > 32:B>C>A > > 33:C>A=B. > > What "good method" do you have in mind that might not elect > C?
I didn't have a method in mind, and I agree that C is the best winner in this example for the reasons you gave. My only point is that the Condorcet criterion should perhaps require majorities if we are to insist upon it. Here is a better example of my point: 41:A>B=C>D 29:B>D>C>A 30:C>B>A>D C is the Condorcet winner even without a true majority over B. I don't see that it would embarrass a method to choose B as the winner of this election. Do you? -- Rob LeGrand [email protected] Citizens for Approval Voting http://www.approvalvoting.org/ ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
