On Apr 8, 2010, at 11:00 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
I more or less despise the election of A in this scenario:
49 A
24 B
27 C>B
I believe the possibility of this outcome is a disincentive for a
candidate
like C to run.
The story behind these votes seems to be that C is ideologically close
to B and its nomination makes A win instead of B. If C is
ideologically close to B why don't the "B" voters vote "B>C" (and make
C win)? If C is ideologically far from B then most "B" voters may vote
as they do now, but then maybe "A" voters should vote "A>B" (and make
B win) (since C seems to be closer to B than A). It is hard to find an
explanation to sincere votes like this. Or are these maybe strategic
votes, e.g. so that sincere "A>B" voters have decided to vote "A"?
Fundamentally, if I said only one thing: I don't believe that the
margins
ranking of defeat strength (resulting from its treatment of unranked
candidates) is in agreement with what voters would expect and want.
What would you consider to be a better approach than margins for
sincere votes? (winning votes has also scenarios that may be questioned)
(Note btw that in another mail I just mentioned also the possibility
of allowing B and C to formally team up so that defeats within their
team would not be considered as severe as defeats between A and the
team.)
Juho
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