Warren Smith wrote: > Well, that is a "Nash equilibrium" because no single voter can > change the election result! ... Nash says almost nothing about > voting. It is worthless. ... But now here is a very simple and > highly effective fix ... Have each voter cast, not "one vote" but > rather each voter casts "a standard gaussian random variable" number > of votes of each possible type ...
Or could we use a method based on recursive delegation? Then at least one voter could always alter the result by shifting his vote - namely the winner. The winner would be Ghandi, of course, and being Ghandi, he would shift his vote to someone else. ;-) (I agree with Abd. Nash equilibria may be less meaningful in situations where people can speak with each other, reach understandings and coordinate their actions. Voting methods might better take *that* capability as their touchstone.) -- Michael Allan Toronto, +1 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
