On Apr 15, 2010, at 9:46 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
There has been some interesting writing about disputes over the
value of
"rational choice" theory, especially as applied to voting. Since a
single
voter's vote has almost no chance of having any impact, it is
rational to
avoid the burden of learning about candidates, and of course
rational to
not vote if it takes any effort at all. However, most voters who do
vote
do undertake at least a little effort to learn about some
candidates, and
bother to vote. Either they are deluded and irrational (which is
certainly
a reasonable conclusion), or they participate for other reasons.
Perhaps most voters are fundamentally not behaving AS INDIVIDUALS,
but as
a part of a collective ...in solidarity with a team of fellow
citizens (or
party members, members of an ethnic group, or whatever). Analysis that
focuses on the choices of individuals can miss the social aspect of
voting, which may be more fundamental.
Some voters may, however, participate as individuals simply because it
gives them a feeling of satisfaction. In Bryan Caplan's book, _The
Myth of
the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies_, he
presents a
theory of "rational irrationality." He argues that voters rationally
choose to vote irrationally (in terms of policy), because the
psychological satisfaction of voting in line with one's (erroneous)
beliefs outweighs the risk of negative outcomes from that action
(since
each vote has virtually zero impact on the outcome.)
This is a fascinating topic, that makes the debates about methods, or
ordinal vs. cardinal voting seem a bit lacking.
i do *not* think that it makes the debates about methods, etc. lacking
at all. it brings the debate to a fundamental level. why do we even
*have* voting and participatory democracy? what problem or exercise
are we trying to solve by having elections? (alternatives could
include qualifying examinations, can you imagine how poorly Bush would
have done if he had to pass a meaningful written exam to become
president?) when we keep those fundamental questions in mind, we might
be able to debate meaningfully about election methods.
i also think that this Nash thingie is a non-issue. and i continue to
think that, on a fundamental level, if participatory democracy and
equal weighting of every participating citizen's vote are axiomatic,
then Condorcet is the *only* sensible method, the only issue is, in
the unlikely case of a cycle, how to meaningfully resolve that cycle
(Schulze is probably the best but Tideman is likely to get the same
outcome and is more transparent and easier for "One person, one vote"
yahoos to understand).
the alternative (to Condorcet) is that we possibly elect someone when
a majority of us agree that another *specific* candidate is a better
choice. (and how can that be democratic?) it's amazing to me that
this was known about for 2 centuries and never adopted in any
governmental election method, and it's amazing to me that FairVote
passed over Condorcet in favor of STV when introducing and selling
Preferential Voting to various governments. it was and continues to
be a big mistake and we need to continue to hold Rob's feet to the
fire about that.
--
r b-j [email protected]
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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