On Apr 26, 2010, at 5:54 PM, Juho wrote: > On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:22 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote: > >> On Apr 26, 2010, at 5:18 PM, Juho wrote: >> >>> On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:01 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote: >>> >>>> On Apr 26, 2010, at 4:45 PM, Juho wrote: >>>> >>>>> Draft of a method: >>>>> >>>>> - collect ranked votes >>>>> - use Condorcet to determine P (Condorcet tends to elect a compromise >>>>> candidate that all voters find reasonably good) >>>>> - use STV (using the same ballots) to elect the group of P and VPs (some >>>>> special rules are needed to guarantee that the already named P will not >>>>> be eliminated in the process but will be elected) >>>>> - use STV (using the same ballots) to elect members of the board (some >>>>> special rules are needed to guarantee that the already named P and VPs >>>>> will not be eliminated in the process but will be elected) >>>>> >>>>> One could elect P and VPs also later. In that case one could elect them >>>>> from the members of the (already existing) board. Otherwise the process >>>>> would be similar. >>>> >>>> This is a better approach, I think. Protecting already-elected members and >>>> preserving proportionality is a subtle problem, and I don't think there's >>>> a completely satisfactory solution available. It's defensible for filling >>>> vacancies (below), but when it can be avoided, it should be. (Unless >>>> someone has a great idea for this kind of countback.) >>>> >>>> A burial strategy for P would have unfortunate effects for the STV >>>> election, is a possible problem. >>> >>> The STV election that follows may also reduce the incentives to try the >>> burial strategy. That is because (in addition to burial not being a very >>> efficient strategy in the first place) the benefit would be only to get a >>> better P but not more voting power in the board, and because the modified >>> vote could well contribute to the benefit of the competing sections in the >>> proportional election. >> >> It's a reasonable argument (though the STV election should go first), if the >> voters are reasonable and if they regard the P office as less important than >> the makeup of the board--that depends on how the office is defined, I >> suppose. >> >> Another alternative would be to hold a separate P election (new ballots) >> once the board is defined. Or to let the board elect the officers from >> amongst themselves. That appeals to me, actually, again depending on the >> definition of the roles. > > A fully separate P election would make the board less proportional - unless > the elected P would have voting power only if he/she is already a member of > the board.
That wasn't my suggestion. Rather, one would hold an STV board election, and then elect P from the proportionally elected board. Depending on the role of P, the voters for P would be the at-large membership or the board itself (the latter makes sense if P/VP is largely an internal role, as opposed to an external independent executive). ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
