On Apr 26, 2010, at 4:45 PM, Juho wrote: > Draft of a method: > > - collect ranked votes > - use Condorcet to determine P (Condorcet tends to elect a compromise > candidate that all voters find reasonably good) > - use STV (using the same ballots) to elect the group of P and VPs (some > special rules are needed to guarantee that the already named P will not be > eliminated in the process but will be elected) > - use STV (using the same ballots) to elect members of the board (some > special rules are needed to guarantee that the already named P and VPs will > not be eliminated in the process but will be elected) > > One could elect P and VPs also later. In that case one could elect them from > the members of the (already existing) board. Otherwise the process would be > similar.
This is a better approach, I think. Protecting already-elected members and preserving proportionality is a subtle problem, and I don't think there's a completely satisfactory solution available. It's defensible for filling vacancies (below), but when it can be avoided, it should be. (Unless someone has a great idea for this kind of countback.) A burial strategy for P would have unfortunate effects for the STV election, is a possible problem. > > If one needs to elect new members to the board to replace old ones one could > use the old ballots + special rules that will not eliminate any of the > sitting board members. > > Does this work? Is this practical? Can this be considered to be > understandable and well tested? Are there some strategic opportunities? Does > this maintain proportionality as it should? Any conflicts with the > expectations and needs of the Czech Green party? ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
