Peter Z., Ralph wrote <snip>
"The first problem with this one is that it will elect the President is the IRV winner. This gets you a non-centerist President. Even if you use this proposal, I would strongly recommend electing the President with a condorcet compliant method for the first ranking position and the proceed to the next steps." <snip> Clarification...IRV does not "get you a non-centrist" winner. IRV elects the centrist Condorcet winner in most scenarios, though it does not assure it in certain scenarios. A "weak" Condorcet winner (a candidate with relatively few first preferences) can lose under IRV...But that may or may not be considered desirable by the Czech Green Party, depending partly on the function of President. It is important to understand that a Condorcet winner can be a candidate that has the fewest first preferences...A weak Condorcet winner may be a "centrist" or merely a pleasant person who nobody knows much about and has avoided making any enemies. If the President is primarily a meeting facilitator, this may be fine. If the President is the public face of the party, a more charismatic leader (who may have made some enemies within the party) might (or might not) be preferable. This list has a lot of people who are sold on the priority of the Condorcet criterion, but there are other perspectives to consider. Terry Bouricius ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
