"a Condorcet winner can be a candidate that has the fewest first
preferences."
True in Condorcet, though not expected to happen often. Compared with
each other candidate, the CW must win in each such pair. Each such
can have first preference over the CW as seen by SOME voters.
IRV, looking only at first preferences while deciding which to
discard, will discard such a CW. It is IRV's discarding without
looking at all that the voters vote that makes many of us desire to
discard IRV.
Dave Ketchum
On May 5, 2010, at 8:09 PM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Peter Z.,
Ralph wrote <snip>
"The first problem with this one is that it will elect the President
is
the IRV winner. This gets you a non-centerist President. Even if you
use this proposal, I would strongly recommend electing the President
with a condorcet compliant method for the first ranking position and
the proceed to the next steps."
<snip>
Clarification...IRV does not "get you a non-centrist" winner. IRV
elects
the centrist Condorcet winner in most scenarios, though it does not
assure
it in certain scenarios. A "weak" Condorcet winner (a candidate with
relatively few first preferences) can lose under IRV...But that may
or may
not be considered desirable by the Czech Green Party, depending
partly on
the function of President. It is important to understand that a
Condorcet
winner can be a candidate that has the fewest first preferences...A
weak
Condorcet winner may be a "centrist" or merely a pleasant person who
nobody knows much about and has avoided making any enemies. If the
President is primarily a meeting facilitator, this may be fine. If the
President is the public face of the party, a more charismatic leader
(who
may have made some enemies within the party) might (or might not) be
preferable.
This list has a lot of people who are sold on the priority of the
Condorcet criterion, but there are other perspectives to consider.
Terry Bouricius
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