> From: Kevin Venzke > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [EM] Why Not Condorcet?
> > Hi Robert, > > --- En date de?: Mer 12.5.10, robert bristow-johnson > a ?crit?: > > On May 12, 2010, at 7:40 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote: > > > > > I think approval-completed Condorcet is a better > > proposal because there's > > > a greater chance people would understand how it > > works. > > > > what exactly is that?? the winner being the candidate > > in the Smith set with the most 1st-choice votes? > > My preference is that when there is no CW, the candidate with > the most > votes in any position is elected. But you could limit it to the Smith > or Schwartz set. > > Kevin Venzke Approval//Smith has a big obvious seam where Condorcet and Approval are sewn together. A simple seamless method that accomplishes essentially the same thing (only better) is Majority Enhanced Approval (MEA): Initialize a variable X as the approval winner. While X is uncovered, replace X with the highest approval candidate that covers X. Elect the final value of X. The only time when MEA fails to elect the highest approval Smith candidate C is when some other Smith candidate X covers C, i.e. when X beats C pairwise and also beats every candidate that C beats pairwise. Forest ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
