Hi Forest,
--- En date de : Ven 14.5.10, [email protected] <[email protected]> a écrit :
> > My preference is that when there is no CW, the
> candidate with
> > the most
> > votes in any position is elected. But you could limit
> it to the Smith
> > or Schwartz set.
> >
> > Kevin Venzke
>
> Approval//Smith has a big obvious seam where Condorcet and
> Approval are sewn
> together. A simple seamless method that accomplishes
> essentially the same thing
> (only better) is Majority Enhanced Approval (MEA):
>
> Initialize a variable X as the approval winner. While
> X is uncovered, replace X
> with the highest approval candidate that covers X.
> Elect the final value of X.
>
> The only time when MEA fails to elect the highest approval
> Smith candidate C is
> when some other Smith candidate X covers C, i.e. when X
> beats C pairwise and
> also beats every candidate that C beats pairwise.
One reason I like Condorcet//Approval is that it behaves differently in
typical burial scenarios. Forcing a would-be burier to stick with
insincerely approved pawn candidates, approving them just as much as their
actual first preference, isn't just easily understood, but also useful.
Kevin
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