On May 16, 2010, at 9:24 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 06:34 PM 5/15/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Some objections to Condorcet could be:
1. It is not expressive enough (compared to ratings)
Truly less expressive in some ways than ratings.
This is balanced by not demanding ratings details.
And more expressive by measuring differences between each pair
of candidates.
"Demanding" is an odd word to use for "allowing." "Condorcet"
doesn't really refer to ballot form, though it is often assumed to
use a full-ranking ballot. In any case, a ballot that allows full
ranking, if it allows equal ranking and this causes an empty space
to open up for each equal ranking, is a ratings ballot, in fact.
It's Borda count converted to Range by having fixed ranks that
assume equal preference strength. Then the voter assigns the
candidates to the ranks. It is simply set-wise ranking, but the
voter may simply rank any way the voter pleases, and full ranking is
a reasonable option, just as is bullet voting or intermediate
options, as fits the opinion of the voter.
Assuming I LIKE A, B & C are almost as good, and I DISlike D:
I can rate A=99, B=98, C=98, D=0 or rank A high, B&C each medium, and
D low (A>B=C>D).
The example ratings of A, B,&C do the most I can to make any of them
win over D; the example rankings do the most I can to make A win, D
lose, and give B&C an equal chance.
In Condorcet I ranked A over B and C over D but could not express the
magnitude of these differences. In Score I must rate with numeric
values that include the differences.
I do not understand "empty spaces" above. B&C being equally liked got
equal rating and equal ranking - exactly the same as one of them would
have earned with the other omitted.
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