On May 19, 2010, at 2:32 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 10:37 PM 5/18/2010, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I had written promoting Condorcet.
Kevin Venzke offered some objections, #1 is above, indicating that
ratings have the value of being more expressive. I responded to his
thoughts, also above.
Abd ul, who often writes usefully, wrote a book here, wandering into
various topics such as Bucklin.
My condolences. You were not forced to read it.
Making me think of the meaning of words mattering - such as
"billion". Randomly select a document with this word and the intended
audience and when written affects the expectable meaning:
Scientific community, or American: 1000 million , for they
copied what the French were doing.
British, and most of rest of world: 1,000,000 million, for they
copied what the French were doing.
Rank ballots:
Condorcet: Each ballot is counted. Matters not what the voter
did, so long as the three possible values of candidate pairs can be
recognized for counting.
Bucklin: All of the votes from all ballots, for a rank number,
are processed together.
Borda: The rules defined for a particular race matter - what
numbers are permissible , and whether larger numbers mean greater
desirability, etc.
Point I am trying to make is that, intending to read one set of
ballots for multiple rules, how the rules interact matters - and it
all works only if the voters understand the combination of rules.
The upshot of my writing has been to note that there is no conflict
between Range ballot and Condorcet method, because a Range ballot
can be used to rank candidates and thus as a basis for condorcet
analysis.
Bucklin is a method which, I've been noting, effectively uses a
range ballot to drive an Approval election, repeating this with
lowering approval cutoff. If Bucklin finds a majority, but not two
majorities, the Bucklin winner must be the Condorcet winner.
With a finer resolution Bucklin ballot, multiple majorities will
become less likely. Condorcet failure when a majority of the
electorate has approved the Condorcet winner, but approved another
in greater numbers, represents a small loss of utility, ordinarily,
and this is a classic solution where two propositions are considered
for Yes/No vote simultaneously, they conflict, and both pass.
The base topic is Condorcet. It would take a book to respond to
all
your extensions such as IRV. Likewise I see no benefit in adding
Borda - Range/score is an adequate source for ratings.
From Wikipedia:
Condorcet: For each ballot, compare the ranking of each candidate on
the ballot to every other candidate, one pair at a time (pairwise),
and tally a "win" for the higher-ranked candidate.
You should know that the "opinion" of Wikipedia is not necessarily
any better than my opinion -- indeed, in some cases, it is my
opinion and I put it there --, and these articles swing with the wind.
The definition is badly written. It's not a definition, actually,
it's an algorithm, with missing pieces.
What is missing? I LIKE it.
Range voting uses a ratings ballot; that is, each voter rates each
candidate with a number within a specified range, such as 0 to 99
or 1
to 5.
Or ranks the candidates, assuming that enough ratings are available
to do this fully.
What stops equal ratings?
In Condorcet the counting is of pairs of candidates so the
possibilities for A vs B cannot be other than A>B , A=B, or A<B - no
way to have a skipped rank.
But don't confuse Condorcet analysis with Condorcet method and
Condorcet ballot.
A Condorcet ballot can have skipped ranks. A Condorcet method does
not use them. Condorcet analysis of a Range ballot would assign no
meaning to the skipped ranks. Unless it was designed to do so: it
could do so, for example, to resolve condorcet cycles. Some
Condorcet methods, in effect, do this, with the "skipped ranks"
being ranks occupied by candidates not involved in the pair.
I can imagine doing something extraneous for cycles. That such could
be worth the pain is suspect, since it does nothing without a cycle,
and what might be doable for a cycle would require magic for deciding
what actual cycle might need some doing.
In Range the limits can be other than 0-99, but those are suitable
for
the discussion.
Not if you are complaining about Range "forcing" you to make refined
decisions. Do remember, Approval is a Range method, with only two
ratings. 0 and 1, or No and Yes.
Kevin had set up the subject, as ratings being more expressive - does
not seem like two ratings could be a very expressive problem.
Dave, you apparently don't understand a good deal of what you read.
That's okay, take your time.
My point was about your use of "demanding ratings details," which is
not intrinsic to range methods. In particular, I've been pointing
out, Borda is a ranked method that is a Range method, and it becomes
full range if the method simply allows one to equal rank any two (or
more) candidates without disturbing the points given to other
candidates.
The topic is "ratings" and, Range being adequate for the cause, there
is no need to wander into other methods.
The point is that Borda is not an "other method," it is Range with a
peculiar restriction: no equal ranking allowed, and incomplete
ranking dilutes the ballot (with some rules).
Even claiming Borda is a kind of Range does nothing useful as to the
current topic.
You are showing, Dave, that you have completely missed the point.
Again, you use "must." No, a Range ballot can simply be a list of
ranks.
Such a list might be - but numbers would make more sense with limits
such as 99.
All I see below is noise.
That would be a list of ranks, from 0 to 99. A Range ballot allowing
this would allow complete ranking for up to 100 candidates. Don't
want the sweat of deciding exactly where to rank each candidate?
Easy, just spread them roughly across the range. You are then voting
a Borda-like ballot, and you are fully ranking.
Frontrunner is in the middle? Okay, if you want to cast an effective
ballot, push the rating up -- and all rated above this candidate --
or push it down, and all rated below. It would be easier if you rate
frontrunners first, you can then spread remaining candidates through
the range.
I do not recommend such high resolution Range. I'd be happy to see
Range 4, used as a ballot to feed a Bucklin set of rounds, with a
runof if a majority is not found. Very easy to vote, and a powerful
technique, much more flexible than straight Approval.
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