2010/5/24 <[email protected]> > > Hi Forest, > > --- En date de : Sam 22.5.10, fsimmons at pcc.edu <fsimmons at pcc.edu> a > écrit : > > The alternative X is used as the approval cutoff. On > > some of the ballots the > > cutoff is considered excluded (not including X as approved) > > but on just enough > > ballots to make X the approval winner, the cutoff is > > considered inclusive (so on > > these ballots X is approved). > > > > The "reluctance" of ballot B in approving X is the > > difference between the > > maxrange value and the rating given to alternative X by > > ballot B. > > > > Elect the alternative X with the least possible reluctance > > total. > > I don't understand how you determine which ballots approve X. Is it > random, or irrelevant? Or do you have to find the selection which will > minimize reluctance to electing X? > > Kevin > > Forest replies: > > Yes, the selection that minimizes reluctance. That’s why I put the word > “possible” in the > phrase, “minimum possible reluctance.” > > Start by approving X on all of the ballots with zero reluctance for X, then > move on to the ballots that have > a reluctance of one, etc. until there is enough approval for X to overcome > the approval for the candidates > that are preferred over X . > > Um, wouldn't that just be plurality? That is, you'd start with zero reluctance, and the plurality leader would win. That would automatically beat any win with nonzero reluctance.
I think you mean, then, to "Elect the alternative X with the least possible reluctance total for a majority win". That system is some kind of hybrid between Abd's Range/Bucklin proposal and a Condorcet method. I like it - but it is basically a non-starter until you have an explicit algorithm for finding the correct winner. JQ
---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
