Hi Kevin, thanks for your view on the topic. In election-theoretic language, what criterion is used to describe, that a method performs as well with many as with few candidates? There is a list of criterias in the table at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method#Comparison_with_other_preferential_single-winner_election_methods, but I don't know which it is (clone-independence? Maybe some other criterion too?).
Peter On 6/16/10, Kevin Venzke <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi Peter, > > --- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Peter Zbornik <[email protected]> a écrit : > >Dear all, dear Markus Schulze, > > > >after having presented Condorcet elections to some people in the Czech > >green party, the following question came up. > >Condorcet elections might work with three candidates, but what about if > >there are twenty of them, will the system work and elect the best > >candidate? > > In my opinion, in theory, Schulze performs exactly as well with many as > with few candidates. > > >Q1: What would you answer for Condorcet elections in general and Schulze- > >method elections in particular? > > I would not say Condorcet in general is excellent at this, but Condorcet > fans tend to prefer methods that don't break when you have many candidates. > > >Q2: Specifically, would you recommend a two-round construct, i.e. the > >three best candidates (or x best?) meet in the second round. > > The only reason I would recommend something like this is if you expect > that voters may not be familiar with the strongest candidates. If voters > do not obtain *new* knowledge between rounds, and their preferences don't > change, then the pairwise contests among them are going to be exactly > the same, and the Schulze result would most likely be the same. > > >Q3: Would such a two-round system help to deal with the case of the "dark > >horse" winning with long beat-paths and people being dissatisfied with > >the election? > > If the "dark horse" can win in this way (more likely: he wins because > everyone gives him a mid-range preference and he defeats everyone) he will > most likely still win when you eliminate all but a few candidates. So > again, a second round only makes a difference if the voters are supposed > to get new information and change their preferences. > > The ordinary two-round method is different from this because when you > eliminate candidates, the "best" candidate could very easily change, since > it's all based (in theory) on who is everyone's favorite candidate. > > Kevin Venzke > > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info >
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