All common Condorcet methods work fine also with multiple candidates
(although not all methods meet exactly the same criteria). The first
problem are probably human behaviour related, i.e. people start hating
the voting process if it is too tedious, and they may not rank all
relevant candidates, and that may lead to some distortion in the
results.
Juho
On Jun 16, 2010, at 5:51 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Peter,
--- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Peter Zbornik <[email protected]> a
écrit :
thanks for your view on the topic.
In election-theoretic language, what criterion is used to describe,
that a
method performs as well with many as with few candidates?
There is a list of criterias in the table
at:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method#Comparison_with_other_prefer
ential_single-winner_election_methods, but I don't know which it is
(clone-
independence? Maybe some other criterion too?).
Unfortunately this is a difficult criterion to try to define.
Independence
of clones is probably the best one. It says performance won't degrade
by cloning candidates or consolidating a set of clones into one
candidate.
But it doesn't say anything about what happens if you just add a lot
of
unrelated candidates.
Actually the criterion there called "Independence of Smith-dominated
alternatives" is helpful also as it means that every candidate in the
election either has a beatpath to every other candidate, or else has
no effect on the outcome.
Kevin Venzke
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