Hi Juho, --- En date de : Mer 16.6.10, Juho <juho.la...@gmail.com> a écrit : > > If you are using proportional completion (or > "symmetric completion") then > > you're not using winning votes, you're using margins. > > The described algorithm seemed to make the completion in a > "non-symmetric" way, leading to comparing the proportions of > the A>B and B>A votes.
I see... > > Juho advocates MinMax(margins) which is why he posted > this example > > Not really because of the minmax part but to cover also > margins in addition to winning votes. Not sure what you mean by that, as the example I posted works with both. > > (Schulze is usually assumed to use winning votes), and > also why he didn't > > like it when I pointed out that clone independence and > ISDA were the > > probable answers to your criteria question > > That was on the minmax part. Minmax doesn't meet the Smith > criterion and clone independence (in some extreme > situations). Also in this case I wanted to cover also those > methods in the discussion (in addition to the usual Smith+WV > ones and criteria that those methods meet). > > Kevin Venzke is usually more on the WV and Smith set line > (right?). I rarely advocate Smith. I find it such a weak criterion that it's not worth sacrificing much to satisfy it. I prefer CDTT or criteria that are reminiscent of it, geared towards respecting full majorities. > When it comes to real life elections I tend to think that > all common Condorcet methods are pretty similar, and because > of that similarity all the vulnerabilities and dramatic > looking criteria do not mean that much in real elections. > They make wonderful tools for propaganda though since one > can construct dramatic looking (often just theoretical, not > real life like) examples and criteria. I admit your truncation example was more dramatic than mine. Kevin ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info