Juho, we have the example 49: A 48: B>C 3: C>B
you wrote to me: "- C loses to B, 3-48. In winning votes the strength of this loss is 48. - B loses to A, 48-49. In winning votes the strength of this loss is 49. - A loses to C, 49-51. In winning votes the strength of this loss is 51." Thus: "If the three C voters will truncate then they will win instead of B in winning votes based Condorcet methods." This is correct, if proportional completion is not used (see page 42 in http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze2.pdf) If proportional completion is used (which I would recommend) then B wins. If proportional completion is used, then we need to fill in the preferences of the ones who did not vote: We have 100 voters. - C loses to B, 3-48, means 49 voters did not vote. We split each voter into two: the first has weight 3/51 of a vote and the second 48/51, which gives a total score of 49*3/51+3 vs 49*48/51+48 - B loses to A, 48-49, means 3 voters did not vote. We split each voter into two: the first has weight 48/97 and the second 49/97, which gives a total score of 3*48/97+48 vs 3*49/97+49 - A loses to C, 49-51, means all voters voted. Thus after the proportional completion, the vote tally is the following: - C loses to B, 5,88-94,12. In winning votes the strength of this loss is 94,12. - B loses to A, 49,48-50,52. In winning votes the strength of this loss is 50,52. (delete this link first) - A loses to C, 49-51. In winning votes the strength of this loss is 51. Thus B wins if proportional completion is used. C wins without proportional completion. Best regards Peter Zborník On Wed, Jun 16, 2010 at 9:35 PM, Juho <[email protected]> wrote: > On Jun 16, 2010, at 9:39 PM, Peter Zbornik wrote: > > In what situations will bullet voting help my candidate to win >> (considering the advanced Condorcet systems)? >> > > Here's one more example where a reasonably small number of strategic voters > can change the result. > > 49: A > 48: B>C > 3: C>B > > If the three C voters will truncate then they will win instead of B in > winning votes based Condorcet methods. > > Juho > > > > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info >
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