Very, very interesting. This "Majority Judgement" method almost, but not quite, corresponds to MCA-M in my terminology (it corresponds if removing median ratings breaks the tie by shifting one candidate down, but not if one candidate shifts up). I have not read the book, but I enthusiastically support any MCA method, and am glad that such a method got this level of publicity. Also, their method is very simple to state. (I think that my recent ideas in MCA-asset are a step forward in avoiding problems with vote-splitting, but that does come at a very real cost of complexity, so I can't really claim that asset-like MCA methods are strictly better than their method).
In fact, I'd be open to considering "Majority Judgement methods" as a synonym for the class of MCA methods. I'll still call the methods MCA here, to avoid confusion; but I'd consider this to be the foundational book for MCA, so their name is as good as "mine". Jameson 2011/3/1 Andy Jennings <[email protected]> > Much has been said here lately about MCA methods. French professors Michel > Balinski and Rida Laraki have just published a book about an MCA method, the > Majority Judgment: > http://amzn.com/0262015137 > > As with all MCA methods, if there is a unique candidate who has the highest > median grade, he is the winner. Here are some other details: > > - If there are an even number of voters, the lower of the two middle grades > is used instead of the arithmetic median (which is the average of the two > middle grades). > > - Ties are broken by removing one copy of the median grade from the set of > votes and repeating. > > - They argue for using six grades, specified lingustically not numerically. > They suggest: Excellent, Very Good, Good, Acceptable, Poor, and To Reject > > > Andy Jennings > > > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > >
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