On Jun 1, 2011, at 3:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
[email protected] wrote:
It seems to me that thevoters are more worried about the ballot type
and ease of voting it than they are of the exact counting rules.
There are several Condorcet methods that are clone proof and
monotonic without being too complicated.
Let's start by narrowing the field:
- Forget plurality - we offer that bullet voting suits many as
in Approval.
- Approval thinking is backed in Condorcet - voters simply pick
any rank, and approve all desired at that rank.
- Condorcet thinking with its ranking satisfies the above and
many others - usually by identifying a CW. Cycles inspire debate but
are basically selecting one member from among the cycle leaders
according to method details.
- Others, such as range and asset, require additional work by
voters and counters.
Perhaps, but not to the extent that Schulze has passed yet, if
complexity is the reason we don't have Schulze yet (or why Toby
failed). Thus I was trying to find very simple rules that would do
reasonably well, and I think you could do worse than Copeland with
simple tiebreaker.
As far as complexity is concerned, I'd rank them in about this order:
1. Approval, plurality
2. Range
(some distance here because of the unfamiliarity of the Condorcet
treatment in general)
3. Copeland
4. Minmax
5. Ranked Pairs
(quite some distance)
6. Schulze (although the CSSD phrasing may make it seem simpler)
(quite a lot more)
7. DAC/DSC and other very complex rules.
Your chain-based and uncovered methods would be somewhere between
Copeland and Schulze. I'm not sure exactly where, because I don't
know whether they feel unfamiliar because I'm not used to them, or
because the electorate wouldn't be.
I'm not sure where Borda-elimination would be, either. Borda would
probably be between Range and Copeland, but Borda isn't any good as
a method because of its extreme susceptibility to teaming and
tactical voting.
I agree with Kevin that "elect the CW if there is one, else elect the
candidate ranked (or ranked above last) on the greatest number of
ballots" is plenty simple, and is much
more satisfactory than MinMax or Copeland in other respects.
True enough. I'd probably prefer it to be Smith, though, and I hope
the voters wouldn't feel penalized for giving the rank all the way
down to the last candidate. If someone were to reason "Even though I
don't like these guys, I'd rather have this one than that one", it
would be bad if the ballot interpreted this to say that they
approved of every candidate.
Voting that they approve should be read as such - they should not vote
it unless they mean it. The method and the teaching should agree on
this.
But, as I said, what we really need to concentrate on is simplicity
in votinig, i.e. how do we make ballots that easy to use for "Hodge,
fresh from the plough," as Lewis Carroll put it.
It has been averred many times on this list that in Australia, where
partial rankings are considered spoiled ballots, the vast majority of
voters fill out their ballots by copying "candidate cards" which are
published sample ballots recommended by the various candidates.
Forcing full rank is bad, you'll get no disagreement from me there.
I do think the EM style ballot is simple enough, though: rank as
many as you want, and if you feel like it, make use of equal-rank,
too. Although the equal-rank part hasn't to my knowledge been used
elsewhere, the rest seems to work where it has been used. Earlier, I
gave examples of STV use in the US, and STV is also used elsewhere
in the world without voters really complaining about the complexity
of the ballot.
Agreed forcing full ranking is bad, while ranking implies approval.
- Equal ranking needs permitting since it often agrees with
voter thoughts.
- Write-ins should be accepted, though there are two groups:
- Rare stray votes, which deserve no attention.
- Serious attempts to elect without having formally
nominated. Painful counting, but need counting when this happens.
How many different rank numbers?
- Perhaps at least three to accommodate voter desires.
- Perhaps not more than three to minimize use of ballot space.
Asset voting makes this automatic for 100% of the voters. That's
probably going too far, so how do we get a compromise between Asset
voting and Condorcet?
Approval Asset, perhaps? But I'd prefer the power to stay with the
voters as much as possible. If we have representative democracy
because the people can't make every decision themselves, then one
should move away from the ideal (direct) democracy as little as is
required.
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