Kathy wrote: > Let all the voters vote for one or two candidates. Considering this Approval-like method on its own, without any proxy aspects, I see problems. Capping the number of candidates that each voter is allowed to approve at 2 destroys some of Approval's desirable properties. First, no longer is your best strategic vote necessarily even weakly sincere; in other words, it will often be to your advantage to approve B and not A even when you prefer A to B. Second, even when all voters have strict preferences over all candidates, there may be an equilibrium that doesn't elect a sincere Condorcet winner. As an overly dramatic example, if the sincere preferences are
49:A>B>C>D>E>F 3:D>C>F>E>B>A 48:F>E>C>D>B>A One equilibrium, I claim, would be 49:A,B 3:D 48:F,D which elects D even though 97 of the 100 voters prefer C to D. Just going by intermediate results, as from polls, it might be very difficult for C to emerge as a contender. -- Rob LeGrand [email protected] ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
