Having flunked on a detail Saturday, I will try to do better tonight.
This SODA is a possibility for improving Approval.
I remain a Condorcet backer:
. What it offers is valuable to voters seeing the value of
ranking in voting.
. Approval voting is doable within Condorcet (and having full
value within its capability) for those preferring to avoid actual
ranking.
On Jun 6, 2011, at 2:51 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/6 <[email protected]>
----- Original Message -----
From: Jameson Quinn
> 2011/6/5 Dave Ketchum
>
> > I see this as Approval with a complication - that Jameson
> calls SODA. It
> > gets a lot of thought here, including claimed Condorcet
> compliance. I offer
> > what I claim is a true summary of what I would call smart
> Approval. What I
> > see:
> > . Candidates each offer draft Approval votes which voters
> can know in
> > making their decisions.
> >
>
> You are close, but apparently Forest and I haven't explained the
> system well
> enough. Candidates offer full or truncated rankings of other
> candidates.
>
> > . Vote by Approval rules.
> > . If there is no winner, then each candidate gets to vote
> above draft
> > once for each ballot that bullet voted for that candidate.
> >
Exactly what the candidates may/shall do is a topic for later design.
It starts with:
. Before the election the candidates define what voting they
will do if lack of winner gives them the opportunity/duty.
. Voters know of these promises and either do Approval voting or
do bullet voting to have the voted for candidate vote as promised.
. If no winner these extra votes hopefully will see to deciding
on a winner.
>
> Candidates may vote any approval ballot consistent with the
> ranking above
> once for each ballot. They do so simultaneously, once, after the
full
> results and all candidate's rankings have been published.
> "Consistent with"
> means that they simply set an approval cutoff - a lowest
> approved candidate
> - and all candidates above that in their ranking are approved.
>
> > . If a voter is thinking bullet voting, but wants to avoid
> the above -
> > voting also for an unreal write-in will avoid giving the
> candidate a draft
> > vote.
Instead of an "unreal write-in" it could be a virtual candidate
whose name is
"No proxy for me" meaning "I do not delegate my approvals to any
candidate."
>
> Yes.
>
> You've left out one extra check on this system, wherein the top
> two approval
> candidates are recounted in a virtual runoff without any "delegated
> approvals" between those two.>
> >
> > I do not see the claimed compliance, for voters do not get to
> do ranking.
...
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