2011/7/4 James Gilmour <[email protected]> > Jameson Quinn > Sent: Monday, July 04, 2011 5:03 PM > > As I said in my last message, asset-like systems can let you > > have your cake and eat it, if you trust your favorite > > candidate to agree with you in ranking other candidates. This > > is fundamentally different from trusting your party, because > > your "favorite candidate" in asset-like systems could, in > > principle, be arbitrarily close to you - even BE you, if > > you're willing to give up vote anonymity, and if the system > > allows this extreme. Most systems will put some limits on > > this, but still, they are far closer to this extreme than any > > party list system. Also, there is no need to stay within the > > arbitrary bounds of any party; a candidate can have > > affinities based on ideology, so candidates at the fringes of > > their party (including the centrist fringes) have full freedom. > > I am a campaigner for practical reform of voting systems and I do not think > an asset system or asset-like system will be acceptable > for partisan public elections - certainly not here in the UK. And I see > nothing in US or Canadian politics to make me think such > a system might be any more acceptable there. >
I disagree, if the asset-like transfers were pre-announced and optional to the voter. That is, no "smoke-filled room" after the election; everything is there on the ballot. This still leaves a broad array of possible ballot formats/complexities and transfer/assignment rules. JQ > > > > I disagree about the "no such system" statement. I myself > > have worked out an unpublished system which is not perfectly > > droop-PR, but is a ~99% approximation thereof; and which is > > complicated, but still 2n² summable. It's not worth sharing > > the details here, but, having gone through the exercise, I > > believe that it should be possible to do better than I did. > > If you have done this I would encourage you to write it up for publication > in the (somewhat informal) technical journal "Voting > matters". In the UK we do not sum or count the ballot papers from any > public elections in the precincts, but it would be very > interesting to see how this could be done in a practical way for STV-PR or > a system that would deliver comparable PR results. > > I thank you for your suggestion, and I'll consider it. Just to give you an idea, my system is bucklin-like (rated ballot considered as a falling-threshold series of approval ballots); and the summable matrices for my system, for each approval threshold, are the candidateXcandidate correlations (co-occurences) and the candidateX(number of ballots with each number of approvals) matrix. With reasonable assumptions about the homogeneity of the higher-order candidate correlations, this system gives a proportional result. JQ
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