Yes, by sequentially eliminating one member of the remaining largest diameter pair, the method elects a centrist.
If this is considered a problem, it can be overcome by sequentially eliminating one member of the current smallest diameter pair. However, this variant introduces a strong incentive for compromise, which is nil in the other version. ----- Original Message ----- From: Jameson Quinn > This system seems explicitly designed to elect a centrist. In their > experimental > paperonMajority Judgment, system inventors Badinski and Laraki run a > simulation > to see how often different systems elect a centrist. Most > systems they test > either elect the centrist almost always (ie, condorcet systems) > or almost > never (plurality, IRV, runoffs), but their MJ system does about > half the > time. They argue that this "lack of bias" either towards or away from > centrists is best, because a system which is too skewed to the > middle or to > the extremes will distort the political dialogue in > corresponding ways. > Though I think their simulation is just a rudimentary first > step, I find > their normative argument convincing; and so I don't really like this > "distance" method. > > JQ > > 2011/7/10 > > > First find a clone consistent way of defining distance between > candidates.> > > Then while two or more candidates remain > > of the two with the greatest distance from each other > > eliminate the one with the greatest pairwise defeat > > EndWhile. > > > > Various variants are possble. For example, you could count > defeats only > > from the remaining > > candidates. Also there are various possible measures of > defeat strength. > > In that regard, if you say that > > any defeat by covering is stronger than every non-covering > defeat, then the > > method will always elect a > > covered candidate. > > > > To get a distance estimate in a large election you could just > ask each > > voter to list the pair of candidates > > that seem the most different on the issue or combination of > issues of most > > concern (to that voter). The > > pair submitted by the greatest number of voters would be the > first pair > > considered, etc. > > > > What potential for manipulation does this direct approach introduce? > > > > Perhaps voters would try to pit their favorites' rivals > against each other. > > Would that be insincere? Not if > > they consider their favorite to have a reasonable middle of > the road > > position, while viewing the rivals as > > being at opposite unreasonable extremes. > > > > What indirect measure of distance could be used? > > > > If we count the number of ballots on which candidates X and Y > are ranked at > > opposite extremes (top > > rank for one versus unranked for the other), the monotonicity > of the method > > would probably be > > destroyed. Is there a more subtle way of inferring the > distance that > > wouldn't destroy the monotonicity? > > > > ---- > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em > for list info > > > ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
